The Human Capital of Scandinavia?: Citizenship Dilemmas in the Cross-Border Øresund Region by Grace, Toni Lucia
  
1 
 
 
The Human Capital of Scandinavia?: 
 
Citizenship Dilemmas in the  
Cross-Border Øresund Region 
 
 
Toni Lucia Grace 
 
 
A thesis  
submitted to Victoria University of Wellington in fulfilment of the 
requirements for the degree of  
Master of Arts  
in Political Science 
 
 
Victoria University of Wellington 
 
 
 
2013 
  
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
3 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Abstract ...................................................................................................................................... 4 
Acknowledgements .................................................................................................................... 5 
Abbreviations ............................................................................................................................. 6 
 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 7 
 
Chapter One:     A “Borderless World”? Regional Integration and National Citizenship ........ 17 
 
Chapter Two      Building Bridges: Cross-Border Integration in the Øresund Region. ............ 36 
 
Chapter Three   Divergent Citizenship Models in Denmark and Sweden ............................... 56 
 
Chapter Four     Citizenship Dilemmas in the Øresund Region  ............................................... 76 
 
Chapter Five      Conclusion...................................................................................................... 95 
 
Appendicies   Appendix 1: List of Figures .............................................................................. 100 
                         Appendix 2: List of Interviewees  .................................................................... 101 
Bibliography ........................................................................................................................... 102 
 
 
 
  
4 
 
Abstract 
 
The Øresund Region of Eastern Denmark and Southern Sweden is an ambitious cross-border 
integration project, aiming to make the region “The Human Capital of Scandinavia”. 
Integration has deepened to include cross-border social rights, with regional proponents 
heralding the emergence of “Øresund citizens”. Yet the two welfare states, despite their 
common attributes, have developed dissimilar attitudes towards the rise of a multicultural 
society in recent years, establishing divergent national citizenship policies in response. This 
thesis uses the Øresund region as a critical case study, which contributes to wider European 
debates about the tension between regional freedom of movement and national 
determination over citizenship. To explore this regional integration — national citizenship 
nexus, this thesis asks; to what extent do divergent national citizenship models inhibit 
deeper cross-border integration and prospects for regional citizenship? Drawing on a range 
of primary and secondary information sources, including interviews with regional political 
actors, this thesis reveals how divergent national citizenship policies rouse political debate 
about belonging and entitlement of foreigners in the cross-border region. Discordant 
national citizenship policies have reinforced organisation and conceptual borders along 
national lines, revealing that the cultural proximity of these Nordic neighbours is no 
guarantee of seamless cross-border movement and integration. This thesis demonstrates 
that citizenship policies not only have a domestic impact but can also become a point of 
tension between member states, with implications for regional integration and citizenship.  
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Introduction 
 
 
Border regions increasingly represent promising locations for the creation of functional, 
prosperous economies, transforming the concept of the border from one of division to one 
of dynamic transnational cooperation and participation. The cross-border Øresund1 Region 
of Eastern Denmark and Southern Sweden, connected by the Øresund Bridge, is touted as 
one of Europe’s leading border regions. This is not only because of the depth of integration, 
but also because of the linguistic, cultural and political ties of the two Scandinavian 
neighbours. This ambitious cross-border integration project aims to make the Øresund 
region “The Human Capital of Scandinavia”. Indeed, if one were to predict the emergence of 
new forms of transnational citizenship and belonging in European border regions, the 
Øresund region would be a likely setting for such developments.  
Yet the two welfare states, despite their common attributes, have developed dissimilar 
attitudes towards the rise of a multicultural society in recent years, and divergent national 
citizenship policies in response. These political differences have proven to be a key political 
tension as attempts to integrate the region have progressed. Cases such as this illustrate 
that efforts to normalise regional integration and transnational movement are often 
challenged by the persistence of territorial, organisational, and conceptual borders2 
between member states, which can hinder cross-border dynamics. 
To explore this regional integration — national citizenship nexus this thesis asks;  
To what extent do divergent national citizenship models inhibit deeper cross-border 
integration and prospects for regional citizenship?  
Given the centrality of free movement and cross-border rights to the regional integration 
process, I hypothesise that divergent national citizenship policies will result in regional 
political conflicts when issues arise over the status and entitlements of foreigners in the 
                                                          
1
 The region’s name has two versions: ‘Øresund’ (Danish) and Öresund (Swedish). For consistency I will use the 
Danish spelling throughout the main text of this thesis. However the Öresund Committee often uses the 
Swedish version so quotes and references may reflect this.    
2
 Andrew Geddes, Immigration and European Integration: Beyond Fortress Europe? (Manchester University 
Press, 2008). 
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region. In this sense, the coexistence of different national regimes for managing migrant 
integration will act as barriers to the progress of deeper regional integration by reinforcing 
organisational and conceptual borders along national lines, thus limiting prospects for 
regional citizenship.  
In order to attain evidence to test my hypothesis, I ask the following sub-questions: How 
have Denmark and Sweden diverged in their migrant naturalisation policies and politics over 
the years 2000-2010? What citizenship models do they respectively represent? Have these 
different frameworks for managing migrant integration, diversity and citizenship invoked 
political issues or tensions between the two countries as they attempt to move the 
integration process along? If so, do these have implications for deeper cross-border 
integration and regional conceptions of Øresund citizenship? 
Wider significance 
Given the extent of cross-border integration, as well as Denmark and Sweden’s shared 
linguistic, cultural attributes and similar societal structures, one could expect the Øresund 
region to be an ideal site for migration policy to harmonise and a common identity to 
emerge. Yet despite the various initiatives at multiple levels of governance to promote the 
depth and breadth of integration and a common regional identity, the segregating effects of 
national borders continue to hinder many cross-border dynamics in this region.3 The 
problems encountered in the Øresund region are therefore indicative of the regional 
integration–national sovereignty paradoxes that exist in many different policy domains 
within the EU project.  
The EU is experiencing that as integration efforts deepen, the coexistence of different 
national regimes for managing and responding to international migration is becoming 
politically tense. The free movement of people, often referred to as the “fourth freedom” of 
the EU’s internal market, is touted as being central to wider economic, social and political 
goals of European integration and citizenship, and yet it has continued to be one of its most 
controversial aspects. EU states are yet to develop a common framework regarding the 
post-arrival rights of migrants – this remains a difficult policy area in which to gain 
                                                          
3
TorbenDall Schmidt, ‘Cross-border Regional Enlargement in Øresund’, GeoJournal 64, no. 3 (2005): 251. 
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consensus due to the centrality of this policy domain to national sovereignty.4 This not only 
refers to each member states’ work and welfare provisions but also to their migrant 
naturalisation policies, as each country’s newly naturalised citizens become eligible for EU 
citizenship entitlements in the Single European Market. The right to free movement in the 
labour market might well be reserved for European nationals, but each country has its own 
criteria for how migrants become national, and thereby European, citizens. 
 This is important because it creates one of the warrants for my investigation, namely: how 
viable is regional integration, and the emergence of regional forms of citizenship, in the 
absence of harmonised national citizenship policies? The central paradox addressed in my 
research is that of promoting cross-border rights and regional belonging vis-à-vis regional 
integration, while at the same time maintaining the nation-state’s sovereignty and 
autonomy over decisions relating to foreigners’ access to rights and citizenship within its 
territory.  
This thesis is innovative because it unites policy areas that have previously lacked a cohesive 
theoretical framework. Margheritis and Hummel (2010) note that despite the increased 
focus on both international migration and regionalism in recent decades, most academic 
and political analyses tend to neglect the interrelationship between them, focussing instead 
on the economic and political dimensions of the two processes independently.5 However, 
recent strains evident in the European Union over immigration issues have sparked new 
political and academic interest in understanding the interplay between regional integration 
and national responses to international migration, making this research a timely 
investigation.  
Defining the variables 
Already speaking to a relationship between the two policy areas, regional integration and 
migrant integration policies both refer to a process of “integrating”. To “integrate” generally 
means to include, incorporate, or combine things to form a new whole. In political science, 
this generally refers to processes of integrating a social system like a society or an 
                                                          
4
Boeri and Bruker (2005), “Migration, coordination failures, and EU enlargement” IZA DP No. 1600  
5
Ana Margheritis and William Hummel, ‘Linking Regional Integration and Migration Policies in Europe and 
South America: Facts and Concepts in Comparative Perspective’ (presented at the Fifth Pan European 
Conference on EU Politics, Portugal, 2010). Some exceptions include Geddes, Immigration and European 
Integration.; Roderick Parkes, ‘Immigrant Integration Meets European Integration’, n.d.  
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institution. The more a society is integrated, the more closely and intensely its constituent 
parts (groups or individuals) relate to one another.6For example, in recent years social 
cohesion has been widely referred to in politics as being the benchmark of a well-integrated 
society.7  
Regional integration: This refers to the political and economic processes by which states 
enhance cross-border cooperation with neighbouring countries through the promotion of 
regional initiatives, institutions and rules.8 Processes of regionalisation have stretched the 
functions of citizenship and governance from the confines of the nation-state to sub-
national, supranational, and transnational levels,9 leading to significant interest from 
political scientists about the causes and consequences of these emergent multi-level 
economic and political spaces.10 Regional integration signifies a movement away from the 
presumed innateness of national territorial division, and towards the relevance of function 
and productivity in alternative political and economic spaces, as evidenced in the creation of 
regional economies or bi-national cities.11The cross-border Øresund region, for example, has 
been identified as a significant ‘Euro-region’ integration project because of the depth and 
breadth of economic, political and social integration.12 
Migrant integration and citizenship: In Danish and Swedish domestic political discourse the 
term “integration” usually refers to the social adjustment of people recognised as 
“immigrants” – dominantly those who are non-Western and from the Middle East.  There 
are various dimensions of migration policy and politics so the term “immigration” alone is 
too broad to be a useful analytical concept, though policies can be roughly divided into two 
                                                          
6
Han Entzinger and Renske Biezeveld, ‘Benchmarking in Immigrant Integration’ (ERCOMER, August 2003), 6. 
7
 Ibid. 
8
Ernst B. Haas, ‘The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorizing’, 
International Organization 24, no. 4 (October 1, 1970): 607–646. 
9
For example see: Étienne Balibar, We, the People of Europe?: Reflections on Transnational Citizenship 
(Princeton University Press, 2004).; Yasemin Nuhoğlu Soysal, Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational 
Membership in Europe (University of Chicago Press, 1994). 
10
Edward D. Mansfield and Etel Solingen, ‘Regionalism’, Annual Review of Political Science 13, no. 1 (May 
2010): 146. 
11
 Joachim Blatter, ‘Debordering the World of States: Toward a Multi-level System in Europe Ans a Multi-polity 
System in North America? Insights from Border Regions’, in State/Space: A Reader, ed. Neil Brenner et al., 1st 
ed. (Wiley-Blackwell, 2003). 
12
 AEBR, ‘Sail of Papenburg - Association of European Border Regions (AEBR)’, n.d., 
http://www.aebr.eu/en/sail_of_papenburg/region_award.php. 
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primary dimensions; “immigration” and “integration” policies.13 Immigration policy manages 
the cross-border movement of persons, such as politically determined quotas which plan 
and control the number and type migrants that will be allowed entry into the country.14 
“Integration” policy on the other hand, determines the conditions provided to resident 
immigrants in the host society, such as settlement, language training, and citizenship 
acquisition, and the demands made of migrants in the process. 15 In this sense, integration 
policies are interlinked but distinguishable from immigration policies.  
The study of migrant integration assumes not only the significance of the numbers or types 
of immigrants accepted, but also how they are integrated into, and ability to participate in, 
the civic, economic, social, cultural, and political life of their host society.16 To clarify the 
terminology presented in this thesis, it must be noted that a country’s citizenship policies 
closely interacts with both its immigration and migrant integration strategies.17 As Hansen 
and Weil observe, “throughout Europe the politics of immigration have become the politics 
of nationality.”18 I therefore utilise the term citizenship more broadly as “a dynamic policy 
vehicle for promoting the political incorporation of immigrants and, by extension, their 
more complete integration.”19 This refers not only to specific citizenship policies, but at a 
deeper level extends to the social, political rights and obligations available to citizens and 
residents of the polity.   
The empirical analysis in Chapter Three gives a comprehensive overview of one key subset 
citizenship policy, namely, migrant naturalisation. This is separate from Jus soli (birth-right) 
or jus sanguinis (lineage) nationality acquisition, where most people inherit their citizenship. 
                                                          
13
 Adapted from the ‘Immigration’/’Immigrant’ policy division established by Tomas Hammar, European 
Immigration Policy: A Comparative Study (Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
14
 Stephen Castles and Mark J Miller, The age of migration : international population movements in the modern 
world (Basingstoke [u.a.]: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 280. 
15
 Gary P. Freeman, ‘National Models, Policy Types, and the Politics of Immigration in Liberal Democracies’, 
West European Politics 29, no. 2 (2006): 228. 
16
Rita Süssmuth and Werner Weidenfeld, eds., Managing Integration: The European Union’s Responsibilities 
Towards Immigrants (Migration Policy Institute and The Bertelsmann Foundation, 2005), xiv. 
Per-Olof Berg, Anders Linde-Laursen, and Orvar Lofgren, Invoking a Transnational Metropolis: The Making of 
the Oresund Region (Copenhagen Business School Press, 2000), 18. 
17
Rita Süssmuth et al., Managing Integration: The European Union’s Responsibilities Towards Immigrants 
(Migration Policy Institute, 2005), 3. 
18
 Randall Hansen and Patrick Weil, eds., Towards A European Nationality: Citizenship, Immigration and 
Nationality Law in the EU (Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), 1. 
19
 Transatlantic Council on Migration, ‘Transatlantic Council Statement: Delivering Citizenship’, April 2008, 2, 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/transatlantic/Citizenship_TCMStatement.pdf. 
  
12 
 
Naturalisation policies set out the criteria which migrants need to fulfil in order to become a 
national, thereby reflecting the officially purported view of what it means to become a 
citizen. In this thesis, I therefore present naturalisation policies as an empirical indicator that 
exemplifies the broader national citizenship policy regime. The approach of this thesis is to 
explore the divergent national citizenship policies of Denmark and Sweden (independent 
variable), and to analyse the extent to which these have politically complicated current and 
potential cross-border integration and citizenship in the Øresund region (dependent 
variable).   
Analytical framework 
This thesis utilises the theoretical lens of citizenship and the analytical framework of 
territorial, organisational and conceptual borders20 to identify the dynamic relationship 
between national citizenship policies and regional integration. Geddes distinguishes 
between different sites of borders and how they relate to the challenges of immigration, not 
only in terms of territorial location, but also in terms of organisational and conceptual forms 
of inclusion and exclusion.21 He differentiates between territorial borders as traditional 
customs and immigration controls, organisation borders of work and welfare that control 
post-arrival integration of migrants seeking residence, work and social rights, and 
conceptual borders encompassing normative ideas of identity, belonging, and entitlement 
within a particular political community. In Chapter One, I further elaborate on this border 
typology and how I use it to organise my theoretical framework of citizenship, examine my 
cases, and address my research question.  
Geddes’ classification serves as a useful analytical framework for my investigation as it 
applies not only to the barriers faced by external immigrants entering a nation-state, but 
also accurately captures the different national border obstacles that regional actors in the 
Øresund seek to overcome in their progressive advancement of a functional, transnational 
region. In this case, territorial borders are removed by passport-free travel areas, 
organisational borders are overcome by common labour markets and cross-border social 
rights, and conceptual borders are eroded by the emergence of regional identity and 
                                                          
20
 Geddes, Immigration and European Integration. 
21
Ibid. 
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belonging. However, as I will explain in Chapter Two, such national borders are not so easily 
overcome in reality. 
My research sets out to examine the cross-border Øresund region as a case study of this 
paradoxical trend; transnational forces of regional integration and cross-border mobility 
meeting national frameworks for determining belonging and entitlement. Citizenship makes 
the ideal theoretical lens through which to explore this dilemma as it is member state 
citizenship that determines full enjoyment of the rights and benefits of regionalism, yet it 
remains the prerogative of each individual state to set the conditions for how foreigners 
integrate to access this status. This thesis aims to contribute to understandings of how 
cross-border integration and regional citizenship can be affected by sensitive nationalized 
policy areas related to migrant integration.  
Case study and Methodology  
This thesis uses the Øresund region as a critical case study of these issues, from which more 
general hypotheses can be drawn about prospects for deeper integration and regional 
citizenship across the EU. The Øresund region has been selected as a case-study on this 
basis as one of Europe’s leading cross-border integration efforts, supported by close 
historical, cultural and political ties. Regional leaders place strong emphasis on cultural 
integration, cross-border identity, and the notion of the “Øresund citizen”, so one could 
expect that if regional citizenship were beginning to emerge in European border regions, the 
Øresund presents one of the clearest cases. The Øresund can therefore accurately reflect 
political challenges facing other regions wishing to establish deeper cross-border integration 
and the limits of integration in the context of divergent citizenship policies of member 
states.  
The empirical research analyses Danish and Swedish policies and politics regarding migrant 
integration and naturalisation in the decade spanning 2000-2010. These draw on a range of 
primary sources including MIPEX (Migrant Integration Policy Index) data, national statistics, 
government documents and political material. Although government policy is only one of a 
number of factors which affects migrant integration, I argue that it is vital, as it sets the legal 
and political framework within which access to official status of citizenship and the 
associated rights can occur. The time period chosen includes not only a key period of 
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intensified regional integration following the opening of the Øresund Bridge, but also a 
decade in which Danish and Swedish citizenship policies diverged most dramatically 
following the election of the Centre-Right Danish government on a restrictive-immigration 
platform in 2001. This timeframe therefore provides an opportune and realistic scope for 
assessing the relationship between the two processes of cross-border regional integration 
and national citizenship policy development.  
My analysis of regional issues draws on semi-structured interviews with several political 
actors involved in the Øresund region and on a range of other primary and secondary data 
sources including media reports, political documentation from various sources (official 
websites, press releases) and personal observation at political meetings. The analysis of 
interview responses and political discourse in this research is based on the assumption that 
elite discourses and perspectives are socially and politically significant as they contribute to 
the shaping of key cognitive and normative frameworks22 which guide the integration 
process and must therefore be considered a vital element of political decision making.  
Statement of argument 
My empirical analysis shows that while divergent national citizenship models are unlikely to 
affect some of the more immediate administrative concerns of cross-border integration, 
they do stand to inhibit the region’s goal of attaining a “diverse yet cohesive labour market 
[that] makes better use of the resource represented by workers with non-Scandinavian 
backgrounds.”23 This is because divergent naturalisation policies create two conflicting sets 
of expectations of migrants in the region (organisational borders), which can lead to political 
friction. The freedom of movement inherent in regional integration can both erode and 
reinforce conceptual borders of identity, and this thesis shows how divergent national 
citizenship models can rouse political debates about belonging and entitlement in a cross-
border region. The politics of national belonging and identity, which find their de jure and de 
facto expression policy and discourse on migrant integration and citizenship, also heighten 
conceptual borders between Denmark and Sweden, impeding efforts to foster a common 
citizenship in the cross-border Øresund region.  
                                                          
22
Pierre Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power (MA: Harvard University Press, 1991).;Norman Fairclough, 
Language and Power (Longman, 2001). 
23
 Öresund Committee, ‘ØRUS: Öresund Regional Strategy’ (Öresundskomiteen, 2010), 7, 
http://www.oresundskomiteen.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/ORUS_EN.pdf. 
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Structure of thesis 
This thesis is divided into five chapters: 
Chapter One 
This chapter develops a conceptual framework for considering the relationship between 
national citizenship and regional integration, taking its point of departure from literature on 
wider European integration. Theories of an emerging European citizenship are contrasted 
with examples of EU “citizenship dilemmas” suggesting an inherent tension between 
regional freedom of movement and the self-determination of national citizenship policies. 
This chapter also further develops Geddes’ organisation and conceptual border typologies, 
and how this framework will guide my analysis.  
Chapter Two 
Chapter Two contextualises the thesis case study by outlining the economic and political 
drivers of integration in the Øresund region and charting the progress of the region so far 
against its vision of becoming a “diverse, yet cohesive” common labour market which 
fosters regional citizens. I classify the various borders that the regional Øresund Committee 
has encountered in its integration efforts according to whether they represent territorial, 
organisational or conceptual boundaries for the region’s growing number of cross-border 
commuters. 
Chapter Three 
This empirical chapter explores differences in the domestic migrant naturalisation policies of 
Denmark and Sweden over the decade 2000-2010. I argue that the national political 
frameworks for policy making draw from different ‘models’ of citizenship, assimilationism 
and multiculturalism respectively, forming two contrasting sets of ideas about the correct 
framework for policy responses to immigration and diversity dilemmas. 
Chapter Four:  
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This chapter assesses how migrant integration has manifested as an area of political conflict 
in the cross-border Øresund region, mapping out the regional frictions according to whether 
these represent organisational or conceptual borders to deeper regional integration and 
free movement. I show how divergent national political models of citizenship and migrant 
integration raise organisational barriers to a common labour market by problematizing the 
movement of non-European workers. More importantly, I argue that divergent national 
citizenship models act as a platform for national political and cultural “othering” which has 
implications for developing regional citizenship as envisaged by Øresund proponents.  
Chapter five: 
In the conclusion I step back from the Øresund region and bring my findings back to the 
citizenship literature raised in Chapter One. I conclude that the increasingly volatile nature 
of national citizenship policies have become increasingly problematic for regional 
integration, particularly as attempts to deepen integration raise questions of Third Country 
National24 (TCN) free movement entitlements and rights. This suggests that fundamental 
political dilemmas of migrant integration and citizenship are not specific to the nation-state 
but can also manifest at the regional level.  
  
                                                          
24
 Non-EU foreign national 
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Chapter One: A “Borderless World”? Regional Integration and 
National Citizenship  
 
This chapter develops a conceptual framework for considering the relationship between 
regional integration and national citizenship. Transnational theories suggest that freedom of 
movement and regional integration create strong pressures for harmonisation of national 
migrant naturalisation policies, potentially leading to new regional locations for citizenship. 
Yet despite these pressures, national citizenship policies continue to be developed 
independently, leading to a number of EU citizenship dilemmas such as “backdoor 
migration”. These examples suggest an inherent tension between regional freedom of 
movement and the self-determination of national citizenship policies, and that the latter can 
create problems for regional integration efforts. This chapter concludes by outlining an 
analytical framework by Geddes which highlights the organisational and conceptual borders 
of states, suggesting that national frameworks for citizenship continue to be durable in 
different ways despite the removal of territorial borders in the regional integration process.  
 
1.1 Defining citizenship 
In order to understand how citizenship could be challenged by immigration and regional 
integration, it is first necessary to map out how citizenship is commonly defined in its most 
basic sense. Citizenship as a status entails a legal and political relationship between 
individuals and a state or polity.25 In its practical applications, citizenship is commonly 
thought of as a status, most visible though possession of a national passport. This 
determines legal residence and rights within a particular jurisdiction and can also permit or 
deny entry into other state territories. Citizenship of one country can also count as entry 
eligibility for another if the two countries have an arrangement for their respective citizens, 
though these are usually on a temporary ‘visitor’ basis. Regional free travel arrangements, 
like the EU’s Schengen agreement, allow passport-free travel for anyone within the region. 
                                                          
25
 Bauböck, Rainer, Transnational Citizenship: Membership and rights in international migration, (Aldershot: 
Edward Elgar, 1994), p. 23 
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In this sense, citizenship manifests as both an instrument for territorial border control, and 
for permission of passage.  
For most people, citizenship is primarily attained by place of birth (jus soli), or parental 
lineage (jus sanguinis). For migrants however, citizenship is more often acquired through a 
process of naturalisation usually involving at least a certain length of legal residence in the 
host country and some proof of knowledge in the dominant national language. As a 
measurement of migrant integration, naturalisation therefore allows state to set the criteria 
by which immigrants are incorporated into society as fully-fledged nationals.  
In this sense, citizenship signifies collective (usually national) membership and belonging 
across other social distinctions of class, gender, ethnicity, race and religion. Brochmann 
observes that, “citizenship law can in many ways be seen as a national presentation of self; 
what it takes to become naturalised, indirectly indicates what it means to be a member of 
the national community.”26 This is why the terms “nationality” and “citizenship” are often 
similarly construed. As modern states aspire to be “nation-states”, citizenship is perceived 
to encompass all of these dimensions. Though while there are similar broad threads across 
countries about what citizenship entails, domestic legislation can vary significantly in their 
articulation of citizenship and definitions of non-citizens.27 
A deeper understanding of the concept includes the entitlements associated with 
citizenship, with Bauböck describing citizenship as a “bundle of rights”.28 Within liberal 
democratic states in particular, there has also been an increasing focus on the protection of 
individual rights. The specific rights endowed by citizenship vary between states but in most 
cases citizenship entails full protection of civil liberties, political rights such as voting in 
national elections, holding public office, and entitlement to social security. Influential 
citizenship theorist T. H. Marshall established this notion of citizenship as being three sets of 
rights: civil, political and social.29 Civil rights secure a person’s liberties, freedoms, and rights 
to justice and property. Political rights cover eligibility to vote and to be elected into political 
                                                          
26
Grete Brochmann and Idunn Seland, ‘Citizenship Policies and Ideas of Nationhood in Scandinavia’, Citizenship 
Studies 14, no. 4 (2010): 433. 
27
Saskia Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages (Princeton University Press, 
2006), 282. 
28
 Rainer Bauböck, Transnational Citizenship: Membership and Rights in International Migration (E. Elgar, 
1994), 23. 
29
 Thomas Humphrey Marshall and Tom Bottomore, Citizenship and Social Class (Pluto Press, 1992). 
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positions. Social rights entail the individual’s right to adequate living standards, usually 
delivered through welfare, health and educational systems. The notion of citizenship-as-
rights is conversely accompanied by the expectation of citizens’ obligations and 
responsibilities.  Duties to the state most commonly include abiding by the law, paying 
taxes, voting, and possibly obliging to some form of military conscription.  In this sense, 
citizenship also has deep political connotations, with Faist asserting that “…citizenship 
comprises three important dimensions: the democratic self-determination of the people, 
equal individual rights and obligations, and membership in a political community.”30 
These various dimensions of citizenship (legal status, rights and duties, political 
participation, identity, and belonging) are all interrelated and sometimes conflicting. 
Citizenship’s complexities have been highlighted in recent decades as naturalisation policies 
are increasingly perceived by states as instruments for setting the standard of migrant 
integration and strengthening national affiliation. Such reassessments have brought to the 
fore an inherent tension between inclusion and exclusion. Particular implications have 
emerged for liberal democratic states which are beset by what Benhabib calls the ‘paradox 
of liberal democratic citizenship’, where the existence of exclusive territorial borders and 
social boundaries conflict with the liberal democratic principles of participation, freedom of 
movement, diversity and human rights.31 As such, the boundaries of citizenship are not only 
between states but within them, with the distinction between nationals and foreigners 
creating different entitlements to rights within the resident population.  
As a result of these varying and often contradictory aspects of the rights, duties and 
meanings of citizenship, attempts to amend citizenship legislation are politically significant, 
because they “…open up fundamental questions about the collective identity of a political 
community”32 and how these can be reconciled with liberal principles of freedom and 
diversity. Citizenship’s complexities have been particularly highlighted by the debates 
surrounding transnational processes of international migration and how national citizenship 
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can and should be extended to these new groups via naturalisation.33 Contemporary 
immigration issues therefore comprise a “bundle of concerns relating to movement of 
people, the prevention of such movement and the scope for inclusion of migrants and their 
descendants.” 34 
 
1.2 Transnational challenges 
Migration is not a new phenomenon, but one that has become increasingly intensified, 
accelerated, globalised and politicised in recent decades.35 Fierce global competition for 
skilled labour pressures states to maintain open and mobile labour markets in this era of 
rapid change. Yet international efforts to enhance the free movement of labour remain 
strikingly limited when compared to those driving the liberalisation of trade in goods, capital 
and services, despite predictions of significant worldwide economic gains from liberalising 
migration.36 Part of this reason is that the free movement of people is vastly different from 
the free movement of capital in that it challenges long held notions of citizenship within 
nation-state borders.  The presence and activities of migrants have led some scholars to call 
into question the relevance of a single, state-centred notion of citizenship, instead 
conceptualizing citizenship beyond or across borders. Faist and Kivisto describe how the 
“expansion” of the citizenship concept to include multiple belonging within and between 
nation states challenges this “container concept” of state domination over citizenship and 
national belonging.37 This challenges previous notions of exclusive national belonging and 
“breaks with the segmentary logic of the classic nation-state, according to which one could 
only belong to one state at a time.”38 
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Historically, citizenship has been tied to the territorial and national boundaries of the 
nation-state, which is highlighted by the notion of citizenship as membership in a national 
community. Traditionally anchored in a particular geographic and political community, 
citizenship evokes notions of national identity, sovereignty, and state control. Yet the 
contemporary ability to maintain ties and contact with their country of origin has allowed 
migrants to belong in different countries, which several theorists argue opens up new forms 
of transnational citizenship to emerge. In this growing field of transnational study, 
researchers have begun to pose questions about the increasing complexity of citizenship in 
an environment where individuals frequently engage in cross-border migration and 
maintain transnational ties, challenging the concept of the state as the exclusive site for 
citizenship.39 From this perspective, Rainer Bauböck argues that “…the new challenge for 
political theory is to go beyond a narrow state-centred approach by considering political 
communities and systems of rights that emerge at levels of governance above or below 
those of independent states or that cut across international borders”40  
Others go further to suggest that recent changes in the spatiality of power have not only 
altered the role of nation states, but are making them redundant as part of a new 
postnational reality. The postnational perspective sees these transnational processes as 
signifying the declining role and relevance of the nation-state system and state-based 
identity.41Theorists generally argue that we are entering an era of post-Westphalian global 
order with national states competing with multiple actors, institutions and ideas for citizens’ 
loyalties. Soysal posits that international human rights norms mean that rights in liberal 
democratic states are based increasingly on personhood and place rather than on national 
citizenship, arguing that “in terms of its translation into rights and privileges [national 
citizenship] is no longer a significant construction”. 42  
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1.2.1 Regional citizenship  
Similarly, but less abstractly, processes of regional integration also signify a movement away 
from the presumed innateness of national territorial division. It has been suggested that this 
context of regionalism has led to a “hollowing out” of state citizenship functions, 
transferring them to other institutional levels and structures above and below the nation-
state.43 This rescaling is also seen as a wider movement away from the relevance of 
“territory” towards the relevance of “function” resulting in deterritorialisation of political 
space – what Castells refers to as a movement from “space as a place” to “spaces of flows”44 
where the basis for political action is not territorial jurisdiction but function specific issues 
which require cross-border cooperation.45  
Regionalisation has led to significant interest from political scientists about the causes and 
consequences of emergent multi-level economic and political spaces.46 Given the depth, 
breadth and visibility of EU integration and free movement, much academic literature on 
the emergence of regional citizenship stems from the European context. This section 
elaborates on this concept of EU citizenship as an illustration of the nature, content, and 
purpose of regional citizenship.  
Created by the Treaty of Maastricht, EU citizenship is clearly described as being 
complementary to national citizenship, not replacing it, and that it “comprises a number of 
rights and duties in addition to those stemming from citizenship of a Member State.”47 In 
addition to regional rights and duties, European citizenship also encompasses a significant 
identity dimension. The EU Parliament describes Union Citizenship as the “primary tool that 
assists the development of a European identity.”48 However, far from being mutually 
exclusive, Faist introduces the concept of “nested citizenship” to describe how EU, national, 
and local citizenship are interconnected across different levels and function in 
complementary ways. He states that “What has evolved in the EU is an extraordinarily 
intricate network of overlapping authorities and attendant social rights, in which Member 
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States play a central but by no means exclusive role.” 49 Paasi also describes how notions of 
regional identity and citizenship implicitly represent a sense of social integration and 
cohesiveness within regional projects. He notes that the terms have become major 
buzzwords within the European integration project, particularly identified in the EU’s 
cohesion policy as an important element for regional development.50   
The emergence of EU citizenship has also been closely related to transnational processes of 
international migration, promoting intensified movement of people within these regional 
economic and political spaces. The free movement of Europeans within a common market 
was a central aspiration in the EU’s founding documents and is now touted as one of the 
major cornerstones of European citizenship.51 EU citizenship therefore emerges as both a 
functional and a normative concept. The former describes how citizenship rights are 
activated through the collective participation of European nationals in European integration 
process such as economic participation, cross-border mobility in the internal market, and 
supranational political representation. 52  
As a normative notion, European citizenship reflects not only the need to maximise regional 
economic functionality, but also to create a sense of collective fate, part of a wider desire to 
defend the principles underpinning the European project and an inclusive identity for 
citizens and residents.53 Grahl notes how regional citizenship therefore goes beyond 
minimal belonging to the market economy, towards regional “social responsibilities deriving 
from a common and equal relationship to political structures.”54 For this reason, interest has 
emerged about the potential influence of European integration over member state 
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citizenship law, and the possibilities of this new inclusive concept of European citizenship.55 
The notion of extending EU rights to resident migrants is promoted by postnationals as 
signifying the emergence of a more inclusive form of membership based on human rights 
rather than national rights.56 
1.2.2 Regional pressures for citizenship harmonisation 
As the EU continues to promote free movement and a sense of European citizenship 
between its member states, the issue of how best to accommodate external migration has 
become increasingly salient. While there is a general recognition that immigration will be a 
permanent part of Europe’s future, there is less agreement over how migrants are best 
integrated into national, and thereby European, members and citizens.57  Over recent 
decades, Western Europe has become a net receiver of international migrants. More than 
half of the immigrants into EU Member States, (approximately 1.6 million people in 2009) 
were from non-EU countries, referred to as Third Country Nationals (TCNs). Many of these 
flows are also of a permanent or long-term nature, evidenced by the fact that more than 
90% of those who acquired EU Member State citizenship in 2009 were previously citizens of 
a non-member country.58 Süssmuth argues that “…one of the enlarged EU's biggest tests in 
the years to come will be how it manages immigration and integration.”59   
While EU states have managed a level of harmonisation regarding external border controls 
and asylum legislation, member states are yet to develop a common framework regarding 
the post-arrival rights of migrants. Much of the debate therefore, focuses on the EU’s ability 
to harmonize national migrant integration policies and conditions for TCNs.60 Some initial 
steps have been taken in this direction and in the conclusions of the 1999 Tampere 
European Council, EU heads of state called for a “more vigorous integration policy” which 
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“should aim at granting [TCN] rights and obligations comparable to those of EU citizens.”61 
Possible directions for the EU to pursue migrant integration include the development of 
mechanisms for dialogue, coordination, promotion of informed debate and best-practice 
policy transfer among member states, in order to promote common understanding across 
states of barriers to, and goals of, migrant integration.62  
European integration processes have increased the interdependence of European Member 
State policies across a range of areas, and many decisions taken on the national level now 
have a cross-border impact as a result. This interdependence has led to a number of 
competencies being transferred from the national to the regional level, in what is described 
by neo-functionalists as a “spillover effect”. 63 Neo-functionalism posits that economic 
interdependence and freedom of movement have set in motion an on-going process of 
cooperation that creates pressures for formal policy harmonization across a range of areas. 
As issues of collective management arise, supranational institutions are viewed as the most 
effective means of solving common problems, beginning with technical and non-
controversial issues like trade, but spilling over into the areas of high politics such as 
security, immigration and citizenship, to create a self-sustaining process of deeper 
integration and interdependence.64  Davidson argues that, “Everything therefore points to 
an extension of European citizenship and a further reduction of the centrality of national 
citizenship as the supra-national polity assumes many of the responsibilities in association 
with national and regional representative bodies.”65 
 
1.3 National self-determination of citizenship  
However the question of whether national citizenship is losing relevance and being 
superseded by transnational or regional forms of citizenship is still very much open to 
debate.66 While the flow of capital, goods, services and people may be embraced by 
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European nations, and may indeed perforate state borders, the social and political meaning 
of national citizenship continues to reinforce the traditional notion of national borders.67 
Some argue that the movement of some immigration policy to the EU level has even 
“strengthened the will of the Member States to retain independence in the field of granting 
nationality”.68  
The recent salience of citizenship is evident worldwide, and notably so among many 
Western European countries who have undergone the rapid transition to net receivers of 
immigrants in recent decades.69 A cursory glance over daily news headlines across the 
continent reveals the subject of immigration to be a hotbed of political debate, relating not 
only to the number of foreigners that enter Europe, but also about how these migrants are 
gradually integrated into society as rights-bearing residents and citizens.  
Despite the collapse of traditional concepts of sovereignty through various processes of 
globalisation, Benhabib notes how a monopoly over territory and belonging continues to be 
exercised through the exclusive immigration and citizenship policies of nation-states.70 A 
seminal paper by John Torpey argues that the regulation of migration constitutes the very 
"state-ness of states“, as immigration inevitably raises issues such as national security, 
population growth and composition, national identity; all areas which affect the role and 
legitimacy of the modern nation-state.71 Differences between the states’ interpretations of 
what migrant naturalisation entails, and how it should be carried out, can therefore lead to 
different objectives of their integration policies.72 Some argue that political understandings 
of citizenship are not uniform across states either as they are interpreted through individual 
national institutions and cultural frameworks.73 
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William Kymlikca poses the question, “In an age of migration and transnational identities, 
should national citizenship be de-emphasised or re-valued?”74 A number of scholars suggest 
that both are in fact occurring as national citizenship is de- and re-nationalised in response 
to pressures of immigration and regionalism.75  Some, like Benhabib, have pointed to this 
ability of states to maintain a firm hold of immigration and citizenship laws. This has, on 
occasion, even affected intra-regional mobility of the European Union when questions of 
national border protection arise. For example, free movement between France and Italy was 
temporarily suspended in March 2011 after the Italian government offered residence 
permits to thousands of asylum seekers, which led to significant political tension between 
the two European countries and within the EU itself.76  
While a number of competencies have been transferred from the national to the regional 
level, the harmonisation of national citizenship regimes has always been heavily inhibited by 
the reluctance of individual member states to relinquish sovereignty over immigration and 
population control. This remains a difficult policy area in which to gain consensus due to the 
centrality of this policy domain to national sovereignty; even countries willing to integrate 
their economies wish to retain the right to determine the criteria and means by which 
foreigners become part of national society.77 Highlighting the continued primacy of 
nationalism for key political functions, Rogers Brubaker asserts that “The politics of 
citizenship today is first and foremost a politics of nationhood.”78 In contrast to theories of 
the “hollowing out” of state sovereignty, intergovernmentalists therefore assert the 
continued relevance and power of nation states to effectively challenge and limit regional 
integration processes.79  
Indeed, even in the context of regional integration, it remains the fact that holding 
nationality of an EU Member State is still a prerequisite for acquiring EU citizenship. Article 
17 EC provides that “every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a 
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citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall complement and not replace national 
citizenship”80 Yet due to differing national rules for the attainment of citizenship, even those 
who gain Union membership may still be subject to the scrutiny of other member states. 
This causes regional citizenship tensions and questions the apparent disjunction between 
intra- and extra-EU mobility.  
 
1.4 Regional citizenship dilemmas 
Rainer Bauböck argues that the tension between freedom of movement and self-
determination of citizenship within the EU has the potential to create serious conflicts 
within the regional arrangement, leading to a number of ‘EU citizenship dilemmas’.81 
National rules granting dispensatory citizenship to certain individuals or groups have caused 
some issues within regional travel arrangements, as these citizens automatically become 
Union citizens even if they have not resided in the EU for very long, if at all. Countries with 
present and former colonies, overseas territories, or overseas populations are notable in 
this regard. Bauböck illustrates how the extension of extraterritorial citizenship to South 
American citizens with Italian ancestry (jus sanguinis) saw a large number of these new 
Italian citizens not moving back to their motherland, but instead onto other Member States 
like Spain or the UK.82 Up until 2005, Ireland also automatically granted citizenship to 
children born in the country, regardless of their parents’ status (jus soli). This policy was 
perceived to have been the cause of a ‘foreign baby boom’ in the country, causing concern 
among other member states that this rule was being abused by foreigners wanting a legal 
claim to EU residence.  Occurrences such as this, where citizenship of an EU member state 
was used as a means to gain access to others, led to accusations of “citizenship shopping” 
towards the new arrivals.83  
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Differences in migrant naturalisation policies, the empirical focus of this thesis, have also 
resulted in regional issues within regions like the EU. As mentioned, migrant naturalisation 
requirements can vary from country to country according to length of residence, linguistic 
ability and cultural knowledge. The liberal naturalisation policies of one member state (A) 
may therefore grant citizenship more swiftly, and to a higher number of migrants, than a 
state with more restrictive naturalisation policies (B). Migrants who have received 
citizenship relatively easily in country A are free to live and work in country B, despite the 
fact that they would not yet be Union citizens had they migrated to country B initially.  
For example, the general residence requirement for a migrant wishing to naturalise as a 
Swedish citizen is five years, while the equivalent residence period in Denmark is nine years. 
Due to a Nordic Social Security Convention84, a newly naturalised Swedish migrant can move 
to Denmark with full access to social rights while a migrant who has resided in Denmark for 
five years does not have the same level of entitlement. In fact, if the migrant in Denmark 
does draw on social assistance during this time, he or she can later be denied access to 
citizenship on the basis that they have not exhibited “economic self-sufficiency.”85 This 
creates an unequal situation whereby a migrant naturalised in Sweden has more social 
rights in Denmark than a migrant who has lived there for the same period of time. This 
citizenship discrepancy, and its effects on cross-border integration between the two 
countries, will be further examined in Chapter Four of this thesis. 
A particular concern of this backdoor migration among welfare states, is that migrants will 
use their newly found status as regional citizens to move to member states with the most 
generous social support systems - extending the notion of “passport shopping” to “welfare 
shopping”. Tensions have arisen across Europe in such circumstances as countries with 
restrictive citizenship regimes perceive that migrants are able to take advantage of social 
and economic conditions in another member state through the “backdoor” of liberal 
citizenship laws. In addition to member state concerns, this situation also creates inequality 
of status and rights among TCNs in Europe. Bauböck also points out the paradox that 
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mobility within Europe may become an obstacle for TCNs access to European citizenship. 86  
Non-Europeans who move frequently between member states, but never continuously stay 
in one country long enough to satisfy residence requirements, are essentially excluded from 
European citizenship even if they have lived in the EU for years. This highlights the discord 
between Union citizenship as encompassing mobility and national citizenship, requiring a 
sedentary population.    
The scenarios outlined above create a common incentive for EU member states to 
harmonise their standards for the naturalisation of immigrants to prevent one state’s rules 
from ‘undermining’ another. Diverse nationality laws result in clashing views about the 
status of citizens and the collective management of TCNs and, despite member state 
apprehension, a need for harmonisation has therefore emerged. Yet the principle of 
national self-determination has so far meant that harmonisation continues to be rejected as 
a favourable option. While territorial borders to free movement of Union nationals and 
TCNs have already been removed within the EU Schengen area, it seems that regional 
mobility can still create political issues over the mobility of certain types of EU citizens, and 
the rights and entitlements that they have across member states. These citizenship 
dilemmas show that while national citizenship is challenged by the regional free movement 
of people, national borders are still manifesting in different ways across different countries.  
 
1.5 Shifting borders of citizenship  
Geddes distinguishes between sites of national borders, not only in terms of territorial 
location, but also in terms of organisational and conceptual forms of inclusion and 
exclusion.87 He differentiates between territorial borders as formal borders and controls, 
organisation borders as work and welfare that control the integration entry of migrants 
seeking residence, labour access and social rights, and conceptual borders encompassing 
normative ideas of identity, belonging, and entitlement. In this sense, migration is “...made 
visible by social and political process not only at the territorial borders of states, but also at 
key organisational borders at which access to work, welfare and other important social 
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institutions such as citizenship are determined.”88 I suggest all three territorial, 
organisational and conceptual borders are reflected in the various facets of citizenship, and 
can be roughly approximated to Joppke’s notion of citizenship as status, rights, and identity 
respectively.89  
1.5.1 Organisational borders of citizenship 
Geddes describes these as “sites at which decisions are made about access by migrant 
newcomers to key social and political institutions, such as the labour market, the welfare 
state and national citizenship.”90 This reveals how the boundaries of citizenship are not only 
between states but within them, creating the distinction between nationals, residents and 
foreigners, and the different levels of entitlement each are accorded. Migrant integration 
policies, determining when and how migrants can participate in the civic, economic, social, 
cultural, and political life of their host societies, therefore represent such post-arrival 
organisational borders.  Often taken for granted by nationals, access to the labour market 
and education system, redistribution of social funds, legal protection, and political 
participation, all represent as citizenship-as-rights. In fact, such rights are not always 
confined to territory, as evidenced by cases of overseas voting, external social rights, and 
consular representation abroad.91  
While immigration is advocated by some as a solution to Europe’s impending demographic 
imbalances and subsequent welfare state crisis, others see migrants as a net fiscal burden 
for European welfare states insofar as migrants tend to be poorer, less qualified and 
therefore more likely to depend on public welfare support.92 Different domestic rules 
regarding migrant’s welfare entitlements therefore represent organisational barriers for 
individual migrants trying to access those systems, and also organisational borders welfare 
system and labour market harmonisation in Europe. Despite international obligations, 
member states can still legitimately discriminate against Third Country Nationals through 
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organisational barriers to residence, citizenship and the rights and responsibilities 
connected to these statuses, thus challenging the assumption that supranational rights are 
leading to better conditions for migrant populations.93  
What this suggests is that, despite significant developments in creating a unified European 
space, the existence of pressures for policy convergence, national ideas of sovereignty, 
border control and security continue to undermine regional goals.  This also means that the 
apparent disjunction between intra- and extra-EU migration is flawed as free movement for 
EU nationals within the common market raises questions associated with entry, residence, 
rights and citizenship for TCNs.94 While territorial boundary disputes are no longer the 
significant aspects of European politics that they used to be, it is increasingly argued that 
boundaries are not disappearing but are instead evolving to manifest in new forms of 
national division. Moves towards deeper EU integration and a more substantive European 
citizenship will make this an increasingly significant future issue with “speculation as to 
whether the momentum toward harmonisation of migration and citizenship regimes 
continue or whether national interests will reassert themselves.”95 
1.5.2 Conceptual borders of citizenship 
Geddes depicts conceptual borders as the “more nebulous, but no less important, notions of 
identity, belonging and entitlement... that boil down to the question of ‘who are we’ and 
then, by extension the issue of how these self understandings affect attitudes to migrant 
new comers.”96 This can be related back to Brubaker’s notion of citizenship “a powerful 
instrument of social closure”97.  National citizenship reveals not only the legal borders 
within and between nation states, but also their social boundaries of identity. Thus, 
fundamental questions about migrant integration and citizenship concern more than just 
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practical measurements of adaptation, but also what Favell describes as the “glue” of a 
particular society  across its wider cultural, religious and class divisions.98  
In his conception of “citizenship as identity”, Joppke notes that while national citizenship in 
developed states has been structurally decoupled from identity due to liberal principles, 
states have tried to load citizenship with new meaning in order to promote unity and 
national integration of migrant groups, usually couched in terms of nationhood.99 Smith 
describes how this conceptual idea of the nation “defines and legitimates politics in cultural 
terms, because the nation is a political community only in so far as it embodies a common 
culture and a common social will.”100 
Conceptual notions of national belonging and identity have been reinforced by the rise of 
nationalist, anti-immigration parties across Europe. Domestic political debates have 
witnessed the growing influence of such parties including Italy’s Lega Nord, France’s 
National Front, the United Kingdom’s British National Party, and the Danish People’s Party 
which present the dual challenge of being anti-immigration and anti-EU integration. These 
parties have provided some of the key sources of opposition to free movement and the 
project of European citizenship.101 Such political groups view immigration, particularly from 
non-Western countries, as a fundamental challenge to national citizenship referring to a loss 
of national identity, the dilemmas of cultural pluralism, and flaws of multiculturalism. This 
discursive framing of migrants’ cultural diversity as a threat to social cohesion has helped to 
launch far right parties into powerful political positions. It is here that the idea of re-
nationalizing citizenship and strengthening migrant integration has often been raised as a 
stake - what Favell calls the ‘reconceptualising of community.’102 These heightened national 
conceptions of citizenship and social stability challenge European ideas of free movement 
and diversity.  
Territorial, organisation and conceptual borders are not mutually exclusive however, and 
dynamic relationships can exist between them. For example, political mobilisation against 
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migrants because of a perceived lack of cultural assimilation (conceptual borders) can result 
in claims that migrants should be less entitled to labour market or welfare rights 
(organisational borders). Conversely, welfare state and labour market insecurity could 
contribute to hostility towards migrants when they are conceptualised as a threat to the 
state.103  This interplay of borders is also evident in the context of regional integration, 
where notions of belonging and identity can function as significant boundaries between 
national political communities, challenging the scope of  supranational integration to 
penetrate domestic institutions. For example, the EU citizenship dilemmas and political 
tensions over “backdoor” migration outlined earlier are symptomatic of a deeper question 
about who does or does not belong to the region, and what TCN’s entitlements are. 
Bauböck suggests that these increasingly contested domestic conceptions of citizenship may 
become a source of conflict between European member states. Calling for the introduction 
of common European standards for the citizenship of member states he argues that, 
“Taking European citizenship seriously means a shared understanding of who the future 
citizens of Europe are going to be”.104 
In this thesis, I utilise Geddes framework of organisational and conceptual to guide my 
analysis. While territorial borders have been removed in the Øresund region, the continued 
presence of national organisation and conceptual borders has hampered cross-border 
progress. In exploring the development of the Øresund region in Chapter Two, I show how 
regional political leaders are working to overcome organisational borders to cross-border 
freedom of movement while also attempting to build “mental bridges” through an identity 
strategy which aims to overcome conceptual barriers to regional citizenship. My analysis of 
regional citizenship issues in Chapter Four also employs Geddes framework to examine my 
findings and answer my research question, highlighting the different organisation and 
conceptual borders that are raised by divergent national citizenship models in the region.  
 
Summary 
In setting out to contextualise the research question - To what extent do divergent national 
citizenship models inhibit deeper cross-border integration and prospects for regional 
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citizenship?- this chapter first lay the conceptual ground work for examining the relationship 
between national citizenship and regional integration. It revealed practical and conceptual 
tensions between regional freedom of movement and national self-determination over 
citizenship, such as different national policies for migrant naturalisation. The desire to 
prevent national policies undermining each other creates pressure to regionally harmonise 
citizenship policy. However, the centrality of citizenship policy to national sovereignty has 
limited these efforts. Given that regional integration occurs not only at the supranational 
level, but also in the multiplicity of subnational regional projects, it is important to 
remember that the tensions outlined above have the potential to affect smaller cross-
border projects like my case-study, the Øresund region.  
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Chapter Two: Building Bridges: Cross-border Integration in the 
Øresund Region. 
 
“For us, the next millennium will be about building bridges and dismantling borders.  
Let the Øresund Region set an example.” 
– Commerce Ministers of Denmark and Sweden, Pia Gjellrup and Leif Pagrotsky, 1998105 
 
The opening of the Øresund Bridge between Denmark and Sweden in July 2000 marked not 
only an impressive feat of engineering, but a remarkable act of multilevel negotiation and 
planning for economic, political and social integration between the two countries. Since 
overcoming this natural geographical boundary, the efforts to integrate neighbouring 
municipalities across the sound have intensified. The aim of this chapter is to frame the 
Øresund case study by outlining the economic and political drivers of integration in the 
region, the multiple levels of actors involved, and the barriers and challenges encountered. I 
chart the progress of regional integration against the regional vision of becoming a ‘diverse, 
yet cohesive’ common labour market and explore the notion of a regional identity and 
citizenship that envisages the Øresund as a new transnational space for economic, social 
and political engagement.106 For this chapter, I continue with Geddes’ framing of 
organisational and conceptual borders to identify the various administrative and mental 
national barriers that the Øresund Committee is seeking to overcome in its removal of 
obstacles to free movement for regional residents.  However, I note that since the Øresund 
Bridge opening, these visions of a seamless cross-border growth region became quickly 
hampered by the realization that a myriad of unforeseen national borders existed between 
the outwardly homogenous Scandinavian states, particularly for immigrant populations in 
the region.  
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2.1 Øresund as a critical CBR case study 
Cross-border regions (CBRs) are being developed across Europe as a result of initiatives 
between regions that share geographic proximity but are divided by national territorial 
borders.107In this context, border regions are no longer peripheral and have come to 
represent promising locations for the creation of functional, prosperous border regions, 
transforming the concept of the ‘border’ from one of division to one of dynamic cross-
border cooperation. The logic of CBR strategies is to soften arbitrary national borders and 
restructure border regions along functional lines for economic growth, as opposed to the 
Westphalian notion of border regions as peripheral areas that look inward towards central 
national activity.108 The increasing prominence of border regions has led some to predict 
that future international competition in Europe maybe between regions and metropolitan 
areas rather than between nations.109Others describe CBRs as the “cement of the European 
House”110 alluding to their role as a key element of wider European integration.  
In this context, the cross-border Øresund region of Eastern Denmark and Southern Sweden 
is promoted as one of Europe’s leading border regions. 111 It is a prominent member of the 
transnational lobby group, the Association of European Border Regions (AEBR) which 
describes border regions as playing an “important part in the process of European 
unification”. 112 The AEBR’s annual “Sail of Papenburg” Cross-Border Award has been 
awarded to the Øresund Committee for the second year running (2010, 2011). The Award 
honours “outstanding programmes, strategies, projects and actions within the scope of 
cross-border cooperation that preferably can be seen as exemplary.”113 
The inclusion of a capital city makes the Øresund region standout as a special case within 
the EU as it does not have the peripheral nature attributed to many border-regions. These 
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unique features, including the social and cultural similarities of these Nordic neighbours, 
have led to high hopes about the potential breadth and depth of cross-border regional 
integration. Øresund Committee Secretariat member, Daniel Persson, believes that by 
combining the national capital Copenhagen with the knowledge intensive IT and 
manufacturing sector of Scania, the Øresund Region will “…be that critical mass that maybe 
can compete with other metropolitan regions in the world.”114  
In addition to significant depth of structural and economic integration, “…there is a 
tendency to portray the region as differing radically from other regional experiments within 
the European Union by virtue of the heavy emphasis on cultural integration.”115 This strong 
focus on cross-border cultural exchange and regional identity building makes the Øresund 
an ideal case study for exploring the emergence of regional citizenship, and how it interacts 
with the politics of national citizenship.  
In this case, the Øresund region can also be seen as a prime case study for European 
integration at the micro level. In his study of democracy in CBRs, Hall describes how these 
“political laboratories on the micro level may launch innovative ideas of how to overcome 
the overall democratic deficit within the Union. Stated differently, if the EU will not come to 
grips with issues of democratic legitimation on the micro level, it will not do so on the macro 
level either.”116 The region is already one of the most economically integrated border 
regions in Europe and regional politicians envision that this will deepen further over time, 
“making it the most competitive, attractive and effective region in Europe.”117 Indeed the 
Øresund region has been described by its proponents as not only one of the biggest 
construction projects in the history of modern Europe, but also one of Europe’s biggest 
social experiments. 118 In this sense, it can be seen to represent one of the forerunners of 
intensive, multifaceted regional integration in Europe.   
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2.2 Origins of the Øresund region  
The opening of the Øresund Bridge in July 2000 established an instrumental and symbolic 
link between Copenhagen and Malmö that accelerated regional integration. Travel time 
between the countries was reduced from an hour-long ferry crossing to a ten minute car or 
train trip. Efforts to enhance free movement mean that a growing stream of the region’s 
inhabitants now commute across the bridge,  with their homes and workplaces on different 
sides of the sound.119 Since 2000, commuting across Øresund has increased six fold, with 
around 18,000 people commuting daily over the Bridge in 2010.120  
The concept of the Øresund has been around for decades, with the region deriving its name 
from the narrow Sound (Sund) of water separating Denmark and Sweden and connecting 
the North Sea to the Baltic Sea. Scania was a part of Denmark until 1658, when it was 
conquered by Sweden.121 The region broadly incorporates the Danish island of Zealand and 
the Southern Swedish region of Scania on either side of this Sound. Boasting the slogan ‘The 
Human Capital of Scandinavia’, this metropolitan agglomeration currently has a combined 
population of 3.7 million inhabitants; 2.5 million on the Danish side and 1.2 in Sweden.122 
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Figure 2.0: The Øresund Region  
 
Image source: Øresundsbro Consortium
123
 
 
The vision set out in the 1999 document, ‘The Birth of a Region’, was one of developing new 
cross-border institutions for cooperation, based on the pursuit of joint economic and 
political objectives.124 The Øresund region generates a quarter of the combined GDP of 
Sweden and Denmark, and many integration efforts are centred on the fact that the region 
hosts a high-tech, knowledge intensive economy. A cross-border integration initiative was 
attractive for Copenhagen, as it opened up a pool of skilled labour and the commercial 
benefits of Scania’s high-tech science and IT industries. Incentives for Scania included lower 
unemployment and a chance to be part of a dynamic and expanding capital city region.125 By 
combining the economic strength of Danish capital, Copenhagen, and the high-tech industry 
of Southern Sweden, it was believed that the Øresund region would generate unique 
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investment and employment opportunities, making the region a cohesive and competitive 
force in the international market.   
Since the 1990s, there has been a conscious effort by regional and national authorities from 
both countries to extend and deepen the Øresund integration process. Support from 
multiple levels of government, financial and political, all contributed to high hopes for the 
Øresund region as the bridge construction started in 1995. The economic crises in the 1980s 
and early 1990s were the primary drivers for the building of the Øresund Bridge, as it was 
believed that the removal of this natural geographical boundary would enhance and 
broaden the potential for trade and bring economic benefits for the stagnating regional 
economies of Scania and Zealand.126 
Löfgren described this stage of regional development as “The dreamscape”, where the years 
leading up to the opening of the Bridge in 2000 were characterised by utopian visions of an 
Øresund region dominating public and political debate.127The completion of the project was 
marked by the symbolic meeting of Crown Prince Frederick of Denmark and Crown Princess 
Victoria of Sweden in the middle of the bridge. Developing the Øresund Region as an 
economic hub became a key part of both countries’ strategies and it was envisioned that the 
creation of an integrated system would enhance both regional and national development.128 
Consensus on the importance of such cross-border functionality has driven much of the 
cooperation and integration in the Øresund region.  Building on the rhetoric of regional 
development in Europe, the Øresund region was viewed by the political-economic elite as 
the only way to compete in the global market. The centralised economic organisation of the 
modern nation-state was increasingly viewed as an obstacle to growth and prosperity, with 
more ‘natural’ economic regions increasingly being seen as endeavours that would relieve 
on-going tensions between the global and the local.129 
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2.3 Multilevel drivers of free movement. 
Freedom of movement has a long history in the Øresund region. Since 1954 the Nordic 
countries have enjoyed one of the precursors to the European free travel Schengen area in 
the Nordic Passport Union,130 a passport-free travel area that formalised long standing 
mobility between the Nordic counties. This was swiftly followed by a common Nordic labour 
market agreement and social security convention.131 Efforts to enhance integration and 
freedom of movement in the region is driven by multiple layers of governance spanning 
local, municipal, national, macro-regional and supra-regional spheres. This has provided a 
good example of ‘multilevel’ governance, which has been of key interest to political science 
scholars.132 
Local: Both Denmark and Sweden have experienced significant administrative restructuring 
over recent decades, with the devolution of more authority to regional and local 
governments.133These local authorities have taken a leading role in spatial and urban 
development in the Øresund region, steering integration through a regional plan drawn up 
by the municipalities on both sides.134 Working on the belief that the region has 
“…everything that is needed to compete in attracting visitors, companies, investment and 
labour…”,135 regional politicians and businesses have worked systematically to influence the 
governments in Denmark and Sweden to protect the region’s economic interests.  
National: The national level still plays a key role in cross-border integration efforts, not least 
because of the executive authority of the Swedish and Danish governments. National 
sponsorship of the Øresund Bridge and other regional infrastructure investments has been 
sizeable. National authorities also help integration through the coordination of social and 
tax policies; although barriers prevail on these issues and in this sense national systems still 
constitute a barrier to integration efforts.136 Debates about regional freedom of movement 
have also recently been evidenced in national politics. Concurrent national debates on the 
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theme of Nordic freedom of movement were held across Scandinavian Parliaments during 
the month of April 2012, led by the Ministers for Nordic Cooperation from the respective 
countries.137  
Nordic: In addition to national and local actors, the macro-regional Nordic Council138 has 
also been involved in Øresund integration efforts, particularly those related to the 
promotion of free movement between the Scandinavia neighbours. Established in 1952 to 
promote post-war cooperation, the inter-parliamentary Nordic Council, along with its 
intergovernmental counterpart, the Nordic Council of Ministers, aims to enhance policy 
coordination between the Nordic countries and to collectively lift the prosperity of the 
region. The right to free movement between the Nordic countries has been in force since 
1954 with the creation of the Nordic passport union and common labour market,139 so the 
Øresund region is seen by the Council as a strong symbol of Nordic cooperation and a 
strategic gateway between Scandinavia and the European continent.140   
The Øresund Committee receives support from the Nordic Council of Ministers, and 
collaborates in several key policy areas through a partnership programme for the regional 
sector.141 The Nordic Council of Ministers also supports specific projects in the Øresund 
region that it sees as likely to promote Nordic cooperation and be of international economic 
and political advantage for the region. In 2007 the Nordic Council of Ministers set up a 
‘Freedom of Movement Forum’ tasked with identifying and removing further cross-border 
obstacles between the Nordic countries through constructive dialogue with national 
political and administrative bodies.142 This forum has worked closely with the Øresund 
Committee’s own efforts to remove border barriers between Denmark and Sweden.  
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European: This desire to promote new and alternative forms for establishing cross-border 
cooperation has also followed continental European integration processes with many 
scholars pointing out the interdependencies between micro-regional and macro-regional 
(EU) processes of regionalisation.143 Such “Euroregions” have been incentivised through the 
European Union’s programme of regional economic integration (INTERREG) which provides 
EU funding for cross-border integration projects that further EU integration goals. In 
addition to funding, Jerneck also suggests that the doctrine of regionalisation purported by 
the EU also legitimised political aspirations in the Øresund region for cross-border 
cooperation and self-governance.144 The promotion and prioritization of European cross-
border regions has also been solidified by associations such as the AEBR. The Øresund 
Region continues to intensify and deepen its integration efforts in collaboration with the EU, 
framing itself as one of Europe’s most advanced cross-border regions.145  
Cross-border:  The main body dedicated to managing cross-border integration is the 
Øresund Committee, a cross-border forum for voluntary political cooperation constituting 
municipal and local politicians from both countries.146 The goal of the Committee is to 
enhance the integrated development of the region and to promote cross-border 
cooperation to support this. It works with authorities, businesses and universities to 
facilitate the free movement of individuals and businesses within the region. The Committee 
also seeks to create platforms for formalised cooperation and to promote knowledge-based 
development in the region.147As a regional policy forum for political cooperation, the 
Committee lacks executive power, so one of its primary roles is information sharing and 
identifying barriers to integration.148  
The Øresund Committee also acts as a political lobbying organisation that defends the 
interests of the region before the two nations’ parliaments, the Swedish Riksdag and the 
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Danish Folketing, and also before the EU in Brussels. This requires increasing national 
commitment to the integration processes such as public investment in cross-border 
infrastructure and adjustment of national legislation to accommodate transnational activity. 
The Øresund Committee‘s cross-border vision document– the ØRUS development strategy– 
outlines how the region is to develop over the next ten years.  
The ØRUS document focuses on four main themes: knowledge and innovation; culture and 
events; a diverse yet cohesive labour market; and accessibility and mobility. With the stated 
aim being that by “2020 the Öresund Region will be a model for other European border 
regions with a common labour market – free from obstacles that complicate life for those 
living and working on different sides of the Sound and for those in one country who want to 
employ people from the other country.” 149 Given these multiple drivers for integration and 
free movement, as well as the region’s historical and cultural ties, the Øresund sets itself out 
as a leader in European cross-border integration efforts. Considering the transnational 
arguments laid out in Chapter One, the Øresund region should by all accounts be at the 
forefront of cross-border regional citizenship developments.  
The next section explores how regional political actors are indeed attempting to foster a 
sense of regional citizenship as part of a wider strategy to overcome national, organisational 
and conceptual borders that still hinder regional development. Despite concentrated efforts 
however, some national borders have proven more difficult to overcome than others. The 
following section explores some of these challenges and how the Øresund Committee is 
attempting to overcome them. I also introduce particular issues relating to the growing 
migrant population in the region and possible implications for the regional vision. 
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2.4 Overcoming organisational borders 
While much hype and media enthusiasm surrounded the opening of the bridge in 2000, this 
sentiment quickly turned to disappointment in a second phase which Löfgren describes as 
the “steeplechase course”.150 Øresund promoters realised that commuter numbers 
remained low and the appearance of unexpected obstacles to cross-border movement 
continued to increase. Expensive bridge tolls, double taxation and administrative confusion 
all hampered the Øresund vision and it became clear that previous territorial borders had 
been removed only to reveal a multitude of administrative obstacles.151 Different national 
currencies, and qualification standards, as well as complex Nordic social security systems 
and labour market structures, all hindered the realisation of a functional common labour 
market.  
Central to both economic and political integration efforts has been the creation of a 
functional cross-border labour market with minimal barriers to cross-border freedom of 
movement. This is based on the neo-liberal assumption that if individuals are free to live, 
work and study in either country without hindrance, then the economic advantages of both 
economies could be fully exploited. In turn, this would result in maximum productivity for 
the region.152 A flexible cross-border labour market would therefore need to be guided by 
market forces and not by the rigid institutional structures of a territorial defined national 
system. It then became obvious that the labour markets on both sides of the Sound were 
deeply embedded in different national institutional set ups, which hindered cross-border 
labour mobility.153 
Because of this, the Øresund Committee’s main goal since the early 2000s has since been 
“…to eliminate as many as possible of the legal and regulatory obstacles that exist, so that it 
will become simpler to work, study, live or invest on the other side of the water.”154 Given 
the absence of formal territorial borders for movement in the region, much of the focus of 
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the Øresund Committee has been on the removal of these administrative barriers to work 
and welfare on each side of the sound.  
The Scandinavian countries also pride themselves on their generous “Nordic Welfare 
Model” which they consider to be an integral part of their regional distinctiveness.155 A 
related strand of the Øresund Committee’s work has therefore has been to identify where 
Nordic citizens are not able to fully exercise their cross-border social entitlements deriving 
from the 1955 Nordic Social Security Agreement. Some of the identified barriers included 
difficulty in moving pension funds and claiming social benefits while working and living in 
different countries. In this sense, a common regional welfare arrangement is also a key part 
of the integration process, as a lack of security in social protection is identified as a key 
barrier to labour mobility.156  
The Nordic Freedom of Movement Forum and Øresund Committee published a joint report 
entitled, “33 barriers, developments and opportunities: the 2010 Øresund Model” which 
outlines the key obstacles to a common labour market, social rights, and free movement for 
all residents in the Øresund region. To meet these challenges, the Committee focuses on 
three types of organisational barriers: administrative procedures, mutual recognition of 
qualifications, and legislative frameworks.157 Firstly, the Øresund Committee is committed 
to reducing the myriad of administrative inconsistencies. Efforts have focused on reducing 
the costs of commuting, such as lowering bridge tolls, and also on cross-national 
information sharing to ensure that the labour market, its rules and frameworks are more 
transparent.158  
Among information sharing initiatives has been the development of Øresund Direct, an 
online information portal advertising job opportunities on the other side of the strait, as 
well as comprehensive information about moving, commuting, taxation, housing, social 
security, living costs and education.159  Other initiatives aim to promote cross-border activity 
through opportunities for cross-border collaboration and knowledge sharing.  The Øresund 
University Network is a collaboration project between local universities, aiming to make the 
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Øresund Region “a stronghold for education, research, and administrative educational 
collaboration.”160 Mutual recognition of qualifications has arisen as another area of 
difficulty, and negotiations aim to achieve a scenario where “people with different 
educational backgrounds, professional skills and practical experience have unrestricted 
access to all of the region’s workplaces, irrespective of whether their skills have been 
acquired in Sweden, Denmark or elsewhere.”161  
The organisational barrier I address in most detail in this chapter is that of different 
legislative frameworks. These relate not only to inconsistencies in national labour market 
laws and welfare entitlements but also, crucially for this thesis, national legislation regarding 
the entry and integration of non-European migrants into work and welfare. A key function 
of the Øresund committee is to lobby national governments to address inconsistent national 
legislation which causes barriers to a common labour market. Negotiations so far have 
focused on reconciling the two country’s tax systems and social welfare institutions, though 
these have not been changed easily. Regional politicians assert that national political apathy 
towards the regional project and the urgency of national legislative change has been one 
key reason why integration has not progressed as fast as anticipated.162 Øresund Committee 
chair Pia Kinhult describes how complicated state legislation and public protectionism over 
national systems are some of the main political barriers to cross-border integration.163 
Most legislative challenges arose as the numbers of cross-border commuters increased, 
raising issues of contribution to, and redistribution of, national public funds and insurance 
schemes. Gradual progress has been made though, and some key achievements have 
included an agreement between Danish and Swedish Governments to prevent double 
taxation and changes to national legislation allowing people to be employed in both 
countries at the same time. However, one of the key barriers identified in the joint report 
that has not been resolved, and which is highly relevant to this thesis, is that of TCN rights to 
the common labour market.  
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2.4.1 TCNs in the labour market 
While there has been some success in addressing national barriers to free movement of 
Danish and Swedish citizens, this has proven more difficult with regard to other nationalities 
in the region. Non-European nationals, ineligible to participate in the common European 
labour market, face particular barriers in participating in the Øresund region. The strong 
regional focus on integrating the Danish and Swedish labour markets has not extended as 
far as coordinating national policies for recruiting and integrating foreign workers. Recent 
calculations show that the region is missing out on half a billion Kroner because TCNs in the 
region are ineligible to work on the other side of the Sound.164  
This is made more salient because of the region’s growing migrant population. Over the last 
10 years, the Øresund has seen an increase in the number of foreign citizens living in the 
region. From 2000-2009, a net total of 100,000 persons migrated from countries other than 
Denmark and Sweden.165 The OECD’s report on the region noted that while an increase in 
foreigners could help alleviate economic tensions on the labour market, it would also 
require policies to facilitate the inclusion of these migrants.166  
 
Figure 2.1: Surplus of migrants and births in the Øresund region 1998-2008 
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Image source: “Migration Flows” Tendens Øresund,
167
 accessed 23 March 2012 
As a result, one of the Øresund Committee’s goals is to “make better use of the resource 
represented by workers with non-Scandinavian backgrounds”, and to “devote particular 
attention to attracting researchers and specialists from other parts of the world.”168 The 
motivation behind extending regional mobility rights to foreigners is not only about 
economic growth, but also preparing for predicted labour shortages resulting from an 
ageing population and a need to maintain the generous Scandinavian welfare system.169 The 
OECD’s Øresund report also noted that in addition to attracting high-skill migrants, regional 
efforts should also focus on enhancing the skills of non-qualified immigrants, through the 
coordination of active labour market welfare policies.170Again this suggests that a level of 
pressure for immigration policy convergence, particularly regarding labour migration, should 
run parallel with deepening regional integration efforts.  
Yet, national legislation on the issue of migrants post arrival rights remains very different 
between Denmark and Sweden. For example, since 2009, labour migrants who take up work 
in Sweden are automatically allowed to bring their families, who in turn are also given 
access to the Swedish labour market. 171 The same rules do not apply in Denmark, where 
rules for family reunification for labour migrants have notably tightened over the last 
decade.172 A comparison between Denmark and Sweden is particularly interesting in this 
sense, as the two very similar welfare states have developed dissimilar attitudes towards 
the rise of a multicultural society. I examine this issue further in my comparison of the 
countries’ migrant naturalisation policies in Chapter Three.  
Efforts to remove barriers to cross-border movement within a common Øresund labour 
market are promoted not only as a way of maximising the economic productivity of the 
region but also as a vehicle for deeper social and political integration between the two 
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countries.173 This leads to the second part of this chapter which examines another key 
strand of the Øresund Committee’s work, namely, to overcome conceptual borders or 
“mental barriers”174 to cross-border integration and transnational movement 
 
2.5 Challenging conceptual borders: The Øresund citizen 
Although the primary aim of the new infrastructure across the Sound was to improve 
economic links, it became apparent that the integration of civil society was also important.  
More work was needed to facilitate the free movement of people and remove long 
engrained “mental barriers” to living and working across the confines of the nation state. 
This was an unexpected turn of events given the very similar cultural and social attributes of 
Danes and Swedes, and the fact that regional proponents believed that the integration 
process itself would naturally lead to the development of a common identity.175 
2.5.1 Regional identity strategy  
Visions for deeper regional integration therefore include the emergence of a common 
Øresund identity, seen as instrumental for accomplishing the functional strategy.176 The 
notion of regional identity has been widely promoted by regional politicians and businesses 
in order to foster an on-going sense of cross-border cooperation and to lower the 
perception of the national border as an impediment to interaction in the region.177 Bucken 
Knapp described this as “… the development of a consciousness among Øresund inhabitants 
that they not only occupy a common bounded space, but that they have some degree of 
commonly shared values and interests deriving from inhabiting the Øresund.”178  
Nevertheless, the question of identity and belonging is complicated in a region intersected 
by national borders and cultural dynamics. The removal of territorial barriers to free 
movement brought about a new awareness of national cultural differences.179 These 
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different languages, work ethics, cultural practices and habits have proved to be unforeseen 
obstacles in daily life as a cross-border commuter. 180 
Still, a regional identity is pursued by region actors both as a means of unifying the resident 
population, lowering mental barriers to transnational activity and promoting the Øresund 
region externally as an attractive destination for skills and investment.181 Regional leaders 
are clear on the necessity for regional identity, and that “a credible marketing of the 
Øresund region requires that the region will also develop a stronger feeling of togetherness 
and common identity,”182Hall similarly points to the rise of regional branding as evidence of 
the emotional power of identity politics.183 
The Øresund Committee has therefore also started to pay more attention to the image that 
the region evokes in the outside world. Since 2000, the Committee has branded the region 
locally, nationally and internationally as “Øresund: The Human Capital of Scandinavia.”184In 
order to carry out this branding strategy, the Committee established, the Øresund Identity 
Network (since 2002 re-named as the Øresund Network AB) in order to “coordinate 
information about the Øresund, create a clear profile of the region and to further develop 
its image”.185  
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Figure 2.3: Øresund “brands”186 
 
 
Yet given that the construction of an Øresund region has largely been driven as a top-down 
process, one of the criticisms of integration efforts has been that the fact that political 
ambitions were not matched with a similar grass-roots enthusiasm or identification.187 
Hospers argues that if the “Øresund Region wants to continue its economic growth, it is 
important for the authorities to pay attention to the lacking regional identity among the 
population across the borders.”188 Empirical research into regional identity has in fact shown 
Swedes identify more as Øresund citizens than Danes.189 Even members of the Øresund 
Committee concede to the fact that a common identity is yet to fully emerge. “…if you go 
down and speak to the man on the street – do you feel identity for the Øresund? No… that’s 
tricky business.”190 Other regional politicians expect regional identity to be more of a long-
term development, enhanced through intermarriage and familial ties. “Yes, it will come. But 
that comes with the next generation. That comes from people coming from Sweden… and 
Denmark… getting married and having children and the families are mixed in that way…”191 
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2.5.2 Regional citizenship? 
 In addition to external branding, regional leaders have therefore also recognised the 
importance of how people within the Øresund Region identify with it. This is why an 
additional regional identity strategy aims to foster a narrative of solidarity, identity and 
citizenship among the region’s population192 Due to this absence of popular participation, 
there is a hope that deeper integration will entail the development of different forms of 
regional political participation.  
While hopeful for a future cross-border parliament, former Øresund Committee Director 
Mikael Stamming believes the region, for the moment, “can have other kinds of 
democracy…”. For this reason, Øresund Committee visions for deeper regional integration 
therefore include the emergence of a common Øresund identity or ‘citizenship’ as a basis 
for future political integration. Yet democratic participation in the region still begs this 
question of regional citizenship, a concept which continues to be described through vague 
identity markers in Øresund Committee publications: 
 “Across the region, many people now regard themselves as Øresund citizens. But 
what does it mean to be an Øresund citizen? What is the identity of those who 
live there? What is the soul of the Øresund Region? Perhaps we can find it in the 
commitment and dynamism that many people have invested in making their 
daily life function just as smoothly across national borders as it did before in the 
two parts of the region – those who feel passionate about the region and have 
never given up.”193 
Another question of regional citizenship and representation arises when one again 
considers TCNs in the region. The Øresund project is popularly portrayed as an effort to 
unite Danes and Swedes under the rubric of their shared ancestry and characteristics. 
However a portrayal of regional inhabitants as being predominantly Scandinavian does not 
reflect the shifting demographic realities of the metropolitan Øresund region. Löfgren warns 
that as Danish-Swedish differences and stereotypes are heightened in the integration 
process, a simplified notion of the region as being a product of two national cultures 
                                                          
192
Jan Buursink, ‘The Binational Reality of Border-crossing Cities’, 7. 
193
Øresundsbro Consortium Analysis Department, ‘10 Years: The Øresund Bridge and Its Region’, 2. 
  
55 
 
emerges.194 This has the consequence of playing down other identities within the region, 
such as gender, class, or the many non-Scandinavian nationalities that reside in the Øresund 
region. Particularly in Sweden, the large number of foreign-born residents in the city of 
Malmö makes any ethnic Nordic definition of the region’s identity too exclusive for the 
multicultural region.195  
 
Summary 
Since the opening of the Øresund Bridge, regional leaders have lobbied to remove national 
structures that inhibit cross-border freedom of movement within the region. These efforts 
have been reinforced by an explicit regional identity strategy not only to market the region 
to the world, but to foster a sense of community and belonging among regional residents. 
Regional actors are actively promoting the concept of the Øresund citizen and the region’s 
branding is built on an explicitly cosmopolitan outlook. Given these multiple drivers for 
integration and free movement, the Øresund sets itself out as a leader in European cross-
border integration efforts.  Yet despite concentrated efforts, this chapter also illustrated 
that national barriers continue to hamper cross-border dynamics. In addition to some of the 
more immediate questions of removing organisational barriers to economic integration, this 
chapter highlighted that issues of cross-border entitlement and identity have proven more 
difficult to overcome than others. Additionally, the issue of migration stands out as an area 
of national policy discrepancy which could prove problematic as the Øresund Committee 
aims to enhance the mobility of TCNs in the region.   
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Chapter Three: Divergent Citizenship Models in Denmark and Sweden 
 
Despite sharing a very similar societal and cultural structure,196 Denmark and Sweden have 
adopted different national policies over the last decade regarding non-European migrants’ 
eligibility for settlement and the conditions for their legal and social integration.197 This 
chapter identifies and explores the key policy area where Denmark and Sweden have 
diverged most in their national migrant integration models,198 namely, access to nationality. 
It analyses the politics of national citizenship as they find their de jure and de facto political 
expression in divergent policy and discourse on migrant naturalisation in Denmark and 
Sweden. I find that the divergences reveal not only clear differences in official citizenship 
identities propagated by the states, but also a significant divide in political rhetoric, 
understandings of immigration and diversity, and how society should adapt to these 
transnational pressures. 
Koopmans identifies four ideal type of conceptions of citizenship; segregation, 
assimilationism, universalism and multiculturalism. 199  I argue that their classification of the 
assimilationism and multiculturalism models represent the different conceptions of Danish 
and Swedish citizenship respectively, as reflected in their national political developments. 
The assimilationism model grants naturalisation only upon full acculturation to the majority 
culture, as seen by the more comprehensive requirements for naturalisation. Conversely, 
the multiculturalism model drops ethnicity as the formal basis of citizenship, and adopts one 
based on civic-pluralism, as shown by Sweden’s acceptance of dual nationality and its 
commitment to “a community based on diversity”.200 Developments in Sweden have also 
increasingly given equal rights to citizens and foreigners, reflecting a clear change to the 
core idea of citizenship.  
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I build the case that these political frameworks for policy making form two contrasting sets 
of ideas about the correct frame for policy responses to immigration and diversity 
dilemmas. The empirical illustrations in this chapter lay the foundation for Chapter Four, 
which analyses the extent to which divergent national models of migrant integration and 
citizenship inhibit regional efforts to deepen integration and foster a sense of common 
citizenship in the Øresund region. 
 
3.1 Background to national migrant integration models 
During the first half of the 20th Century, Scandinavia was a region of emigration, rather than 
a major destination for immigrants. Most migration during this time tended to be European 
or intra-Nordic, so it was taken for granted that these culturally similar migrants would 
easily integrate.201 Migrant integration rules were minimal and rules about the adoption of 
citizenship by foreigners were harmonized across the Scandinavian countries. Following the 
Second World War, the newly formed Nordic Council even discussed the prospect of 
common Nordic citizenship. Although this was never realized, the desire for further Nordic 
cooperation remained, insisting that rules illustrating the mutual connection between the 
Nordic states should be adopted.202 
It was in this context that freedom of movement between the Nordic countries was officially 
established in the form of a passport free area in 1952 and a common labour market in 
1954, as well as access to social benefits and facilitated naturalisation in each other’s 
countries.203Around the same time, migration sources began to diversify with the arrival of 
war refugees and foreign ‘guest-workers’ to boost economic post-war recovery. The mass 
influx of new non-European immigrants, in turn, stimulated discussion about the need for 
regulated immigration and migrant integration strategies.204 
Despite officially stopping non-Nordic labour migration in the early 1970s, the Scandinavian 
states soon found that a halt on foreign labour did not stop foreign immigration flows all 
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together.205Integration measures for guest worker migrants were not considered as it was 
assumed that they would return home when their labour was no longer needed. However, 
many of the ‘guest’ workers had spent so long in their host counties that they had settled, 
started families, or sought rights to family reunification. In addition, the arrival of asylum 
seekers from on-going wars or crises added to increasing immigration flows.206 
Migration to Denmark and Sweden during the 1980s and 1990s was therefore dominated by 
asylum and family migration flows, and Scandinavian states have since become net 
recipients of immigrants from a range of European and non-European backgrounds.207 It 
was in this context of the intensification and diversification of permanent migration that 
Sweden and Denmark first became net receivers of immigration and began to establish 
official national policies for integrating migrants into society. By 2010, foreign-born migrants 
comprised 9% and 14.3% of Danish and Swedish populations respectively. The figures for 
non-European born are 6.3% and 9.2%.208 
Sweden was the first Scandinavian country to establish a comprehensive immigration and 
integration policy. Due to its neutrality during the war, Sweden received war refugees much 
earlier than many of its European neighbours. As a result of this earlier experience in 
immigration and ethnic diversity, the Riksdag adopted a policy framework in 1975 for 
migrant integration based on three liberal principles of “equality, freedom of choice, and 
partnership”.209 The policy was founded on an understanding that integration was not a 
one-way process of incorporating immigrants into mainstream society but instead 
represented a process of mutual adjustment for both migrants and Swedes.210 
Denmark was much later in developing national integration policies, though when finally 
developed they were comprehensive and legally enshrined. In 1999, Denmark became the 
first country in the world to introduce an Integration Act which completely reformed Danish 
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integration policies. The new legislation brought a set of new rules to apply to all legal 
immigrants and refugees and also transferred the responsibility for implementing these 
migrant integration policies from the Danish Refugee Council to local authorities.211 
While there are several domestic and exogenous factors which have influenced the 
development of each country’s national citizenship legislation and politics, it would be 
outside of the scope of this thesis to explore all of these in detail. Instead this chapter 
outlines a select few differences in the political and institutional contexts of Denmark and 
Sweden’s migrant integration models, including historical experiences with migration 
diversity and the strength of the far-right political parties. Thus, the aim of this chapter is 
not to explain why the two countries have diverged, but instead to identify and illustrate key 
legislative and political differences that have developed in each country’s migrant 
naturalisation policies and politics from 2000-2010, in order to later analyse how these have 
affected, or could potentially affect, integration in the Øresund region.  
 
3.2 Divergent migrant integration models 2000-2010 
The rest of this chapter outlines the politics and policies of migrant integration and 
naturalisation in Denmark and Sweden. This chapter uses Migrant Integration Policy Index 
(MIPEX) data as well as national statistics and political documents to illustrate key 
divergences in Danish and Swedish government approaches to citizenship policy.  MIPEX 
publishes annual reports and key findings that look at best practices in seven different 
strands of migrant integrant policy based on surveys of the respective regimes in 33 
countries212. I selected MIPEX over other integration indicators because it allowed for a clear 
comparison of policy indicators across six clear strands and a range of countries. 
Additionally, it is scientifically robust and has been subject to external assessment for 
reliability of scale.213 
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As can be seen from the graphs below (1.0 / 1.1), there are striking differences between the 
policies and strategies of Denmark and Sweden concerning migrant integration; the higher 
the score, the more favourable the integration policy area is for migrants. Compared to EU 
averages, Sweden’s migrant integration polities are relatively liberal while Denmark’s tend 
to be more restrictive.214 The integration policy area where Denmark and Sweden diverged 
most significantly 2007 was regarding “access to nationality”.  
Migrant integration models are not only related to legislative developments, but also how 
immigration and migrant integration is framed in policy discourse and political rhetoric. In 
addition to examining policy developments over the next section, I also draw on examples 
of elite discourse, arguing that these are useful for understanding how sharp the distinctions 
are towards immigrants in each of the two countries. Borrowing from Favell,215 I argue that 
two very distinct political policies and discourses have emerged based on different 
“philosophies” or “public political theories” that reveal contrasting understandings of core 
concepts such as citizenship, nationality, pluralism, equality and tolerance.  
It is also important to note that despite the involvement of local and regional authorities in 
migrant integration, this thesis is largely focussed on developments in national citizenship 
models. Despite the heavy decentralisation of many policy realms to municipal and local 
authorities in both countries, citizenship is still strictly determined as a national affair. This 
applies to most aspects of migrant integration policy where, as stated by MIPEX, “Although 
government policy is only one of a number of factors which affects integration, it is vital 
because it sets the legal and political framework within which other aspects of integration 
occur.”216 Hence, the comparison and analysis below will reflect state-level priorities and 
political discourse and will be less expressive of the practical implementation of policies at 
the regional and local level.   
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Figure 3.1: Comparison of migrant integration indicators in Denmark and Sweden 2007 217 
 
Source: MIPEX, graph created 29 March 2012 
 
3.2.1 Denmark 
Immigration has had high political salience in Denmark. The Liberal-Conservative (L-C) 
Government that came into power in Denmark in 2001 enacted some of the most restrictive 
immigration legislation in Europe over successive terms.218 During the 2001 election 
campaign it made explicit promises to its voters that it would “…change the premises and 
objectives of the integration and migration policy…”219 At the start of 2002, the L-C coalition 
presented its “New immigration politics” (En Ny Udlændinge politik) which included a radical 
change in the country’s migrant integration approach and introduced new provisions which 
were some of the most restrictive in Europe. A new Ministry for Refugees, Immigrants and 
Integration was formed, assuming responsibility for the Aliens Act, the Integration Act, 
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migrant statistics, diversity management and naturalisation, as well as Danish language and 
civics education. 220 
The direction of government policy in immigration and integration was significantly 
influenced by the populist anti-immigration party, the Danish People’s Party (Dansk 
Folkeparti )(DF). From 2001, this became Denmark’s third largest political party221and 
provided key parliamentary support for Denmark’s Centre Right governments over the 
2000s, putting it in the position to heavily influence national immigration policy.222 It has 
been noted that DF has had influence across the whole political spectrum, even compelling 
the Centre-Left Social Democrats to adopt stricter rhetoric and policy on immigration 
issues.223 
The main aims of these changes were to lower the overall number of immigrants, to 
increase the labour-force participation and social integration of migrants, and to introduce a 
new set of conditions for family reunification and marriage.224In 2004, a new Integration Act 
entered into force, fully implementing these integration policies and objectives.225  A year 
later the Government launched another, more comprehensive integration plan “A New 
Chance for Everyone” (En Ny Chance Til Alle”), in agreement with DF.226 Building on previous 
policy to increase the labour market participation of migrants and make welfare a less 
attractive option, the policy included a further differentiation with regards to migrants’ 
social rights. Changes to the Consolidated Act of Danish Nationality in 2004 also imposed 
several restrictions on eligibility for naturalisation. These changes were due to pressure 
from DF, which insisted that “… as a condition for its support, the government must act 
tough on issues related to nationality.”227 
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Denmark and Sweden show some significant differences in their definitions of what defines 
a migrant and how to measure integration. In Denmark, negative language associated with 
immigration issues, like the term “Ghetto”, is acceptable and frequently used in political and 
public discourse.228 Another phrase embedded in Danish political discourse over the last 
decade is that of a “parallel society,” used to describe the emergence of immigrant 
communities who live outside mainstream society by associating only with their own 
networks, cultures and languages.229 
The “assimilation” model of migrant integration which the Danish government adopted 
explicitly rejects multiculturalism and maintains the ideal of a culturally and linguistically 
homogenous state. “Over the last decade, leading Danish politicians, from all agenda-setting 
parties… have repeatedly stressed that Denmark is not and does not intend to be a 
multicultural society…. cultural diversity more broadly is frowned upon as an alien, “un-
Danish” notion.”230 
3.2.2 Sweden 
Then Swedish Prime Minister Goran Persson responded to the passage of the Aliens 
Consolidation Act, and subsequent immigration legislation, by announcing that his 
government had doubts and reservations about the new Danish asylum laws and expressed 
concern that tightening immigration laws might present problems when Denmark took over 
the six-month European Union presidency in 2002. Sweden was also concerned that the 
restrictive policies could overstretch Sweden's own capacity for immigration, with Danish 
couples crossing the border in search of a place to live while in a mixed marriage.231 
In a 2001 report on its integration policies, Sweden conversely maintained its commitment 
to multiculturalism asserting that migrant integration policy was founded on “A community 
based on diversity”.232 Sweden’s integration programme in 2006 (Instegsjobb) also had the 
objective of getting migrants into work but focussed on language acquisition, job training, 
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and tackling discrimination. Unlike the Danish government which directed incentives and 
penalties towards migrants, the Swedish government geared their policies toward 
employers.233 
Anti–discrimination measures have been prominent in Sweden to enhance the public’s 
awareness of diversity issues and to ensure equal access to education, work and leisure.234 
Many of the government’s efforts to tackle integration issues have been centered on 
removing structural discrimination; such as a 2001 government commission report entitled 
“Extended Protection against Discrimination” (Ett utvidg at skydd mot diskriminering).This 
resulted in a special anti-discrimination law in 2003. The Swedish approach to migrant 
integration is thus based on a political acknowledgement that social and structural 
discrimination in Swedish society is one of the main barriers to migrant integration and that 
policy measures need to be based on tolerance, awareness and on understanding of 
diversity and inclusion.235 
While Sweden has also had a centre right government for much of the period examined, the 
lack of a credible anti-immigration party, and an agreed cross-party consensus not to 
mobilise on immigration issues, have largely limited the restriction of migrant integration 
policy.236  Due to general consensus across the Swedish political spectrum about the 
benefits of immigration, most Swedish politicians consider it wrong to canvass voters or 
seek public sympathy from an anti-immigrant platform.237 
For example, much of the rhetoric evident in Danish immigration debates is generally 
considered, in Swedish political discourse, to be taboo and bordering on prejudiced. Benito 
notes that in Sweden, “it is not widely accepted in the media to argue against immigration 
and almost any criticism is labelled as racism.”238 The word “ghetto” is largely condemned in 
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media as discriminatory, with Swedish officials preferring to use terms such as “segregated 
housing areas” in policy documents.239  Swedish authorities also tend to avoid the word 
"immigrant," preferring to use the term "persons of migrant origin" in official discourse to 
counteract tendencies of social exclusion, ethnic discrimination and stereotyping.240  
Similarly the Swedish government’s ‘Integration Policy for the 21st Century’ proposed to 
revise policy objectives so that the word “tolerance” is replaced by “respect”.241 It is within 
this context that anti-immigration political platforms have been met with limited success.242 
Sweden is quite unique from a Nordic perspective because of this explicit preference for a 
multicultural integration policy, emphasising diversity and pluralism.243 This is still evident 
today as Integration Minister Eric Ullenhag stated in a recent speech: “I want to be crystal-
clear on one point: Sweden is a multicultural country… The diversity of Sweden is 
positive.”244 This, argues Dingu-Kyrklund, illustrates “a tendency towards a more realistic, 
future-oriented approach of the Sweden integration policy.”245 
 
3.3 Migrant naturalisation 
This thesis explores migrant naturalisation more deeply, as a particular subset of citizenship 
policy which explicitly demonstrates the criteria which foreigners are expected to meet in 
order to become national citizens. Citizenship policies are closely tied to national migrant 
integration policies as they delineate a legal and social boundary in the transition from 
foreigner to national. As described in Chapter One, these legal and social boundaries 
manifest in both organisational and conceptual forms, granting access to status, rights and 
national membership within the state. In his comparative studies of citizenship policies, 
Howard argues that “citizenship acquisition can serve as a rough measure of integration… 
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and immigrants who become naturalised citizens are likely to become much more 
integrated in their new country than those who remain non-citizen residents, or 
denizens.”246 While academic opinions differ over migrant naturalisation as an integration 
measure, the acquisition of national citizenship can have a significant effect on policy 
making and integration outcomes.  
In the case of Denmark and Sweden, several citizenship traits stand out as being similar. All 
Nordic countries have maintained privileged access to citizenship for Nordic nationals, 
consisting of only a two year residency requirement.247 Other factors common to the 
citizenship policies of both countries include the lack of jus soli or “birth right” citizenship, 
which grants nationality on the basis of territoriality. Citizenship is generally acquired 
through ethnic and parental lineage (jus sanguinis). If citizenship is not attained through the 
nationality of the parent, then the only means of attaining citizenship for non-Nordic 
nationals is the process of naturalisation.  
Divergence between Denmark and Sweden’s approaches to migrant naturalisation, 
particularly for TCNs, has been notable during the last decade. This is a surprising 
divergence given that the Scandinavian neighbours coordinated their citizenship legislation 
for over a century until the late 1970s. Citizenship laws began to diversify with the 
introduction of the national regulation of immigration. Comparative policy developments 
over the last decade have seen acute variations in the national legislation for granting 
citizenship to foreigners, and in political understandings about the role of citizenship in the 
integration of migrants into national society. The following section explores policy 
developments over the period 2000-2010 to explain these variances, with a particular focus 
on conditions for acquisition and dual nationality policies.  
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Figure 3.2: MIPEX Access to nationality in Denmark and Sweden 2007248 
 
Source: MIPEX, graph created 29 March 2012 
 
According to 2007 MIPEX results, Denmark scored 33 points overall for access to nationality 
while Sweden scored 79 points, leaving a points difference of 46. This ranks Sweden as 2nd 
for the most favourable access to nationality for migrants while Denmark is rated as number 
19, equal with the Czech Republic and Slovenia out of 31 countries.249 
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Figure 3.3: Conditions for the acquisition of nationality (first generation TCNs) in Denmark 
and Sweden.250 
 Denmark251 Sweden252 
Residency requirement (years) 9 5 
Renunciation requirement Yes No 
Language tests Yes No 
Cultural tests Yes No 
Evidence of financial 
independence 
Yes No 
 
As can be seen in table 2.0, migrants can become naturalised as citizens in Sweden after 5 
years permanent residence and are permitted to hold dual citizenship. There are no 
language requirements for naturalisation as this is considered unfair and unreasonable.253 
By contrast, nine years of permanent residence, language and culture tests, and unitary 
citizenship requirements make Denmark one of the most restrictive naturalisation regimes 
in Europe.254 In Denmark, citizenship is also subject to parliamentary discretion, whereas 
those who meet the legal requirements for naturalisation in Sweden have an “unconditional 
right to become citizens and citizenship can consequently not be denied.”255 
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A special aspect of naturalisation is dual citizenship. When migrants naturalise they are 
either obligated to renounce or allowed to retain their former citizenship, which results in 
either single or dual citizenship in the host country. This generally implies reciprocal 
recognition, whereby both the destination and origin country must allow dual citizenship. 
One of the major factors ending Nordic coordination of citizenship law has been divergent 
attitudes towards dual citizenship.256 
3.3.1 Sweden- Medborgarskap 
Over the decade examined there was only one major legislative change to Swedish 
naturalisation laws, the Citizenship Act of 2001.  As in Denmark, jus sanguinis has remained 
the dominant rule of citizenship acquisition, though liberal changes to naturalisation laws 
have seen a shift towards the recognition of domicile as an important factor in gaining 
nationality rights. Bernitz describes how the new Swedish Citizenship Act of 2001 was 
intended to “effectively fulfil the principle of legal certainty and legal protection of the 
individual.”257 As a consequence of this increased importance on individual rights, the 
possibility of citizenship by declaration was also extended to embrace new groups, such as 
the children of migrants, in order to encourage integration.258 
Swedish citizenship law was amended in 2001 to fully permit dual citizenship, meaning 
foreign nationals who take out Swedish citizenship, or Swedes who take up citizenship in 
another country, are not required by the Swedish authorities to renounce their previous 
citizenship. Howard describes the policy shift as a significant step in the liberalization of 
citizenship policy as it challenges “…one of the most stable and long-lasting assumptions of 
the modern era… The notion of singular nationhood…”.259 This policy development aimed to 
help with the integration of immigrants and to uphold the individual rights of migrants and 
expatriate Swedes to hold multiple identities.260 Although stating that it hoped to promote 
the idea to other Nordic countries261, Denmark and Norway continue to restrict occurrences 
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of dual citizenship as much as possible.262 The Swedish Citizenship Act of 2001 therefore 
marked a departure from Nordic norms.263 
The Swedish changes emerged out of discussions on migrant integration policies, with dual 
nationality entering political debates as an alternative to granting voting rights to non-
citizens. One of the most important arguments in favour of dual citizenship was that the 
removing the renunciation requirement would facilitate and encourage immigrant 
naturalisation and integration.264 It was additionally argued that national citizenship helped 
immigrants to “…strengthen that sense of belonging to [the] country.”265 Sweden’s then 
integration minister argued that dual citizenship and multiple identity was a natural 
consequence of Sweden’s official policy of accepting ethnic and cultural diversity in order to 
progress the integration process.266 Parliamentary members Peter Bernström and Inger 
René argued, “We live in a globalizing world where borders are opened and barriers 
between people are torn.”267 It was therefore argued that Swedish citizenship legislation, 
including the principle of singular citizenship, should be reconsidered in the current context 
of internationalisation and global interdependence.268 
The outcome of these legislative changes can be seen in each country’s naturalisation rates. 
In 2009, Sweden granted citizenship to 29,500 foreigners while the comparative Danish 
figure was 6,900.269 To control for population differences, one commonly used indicator to 
measure the effect of national citizenship policies is the 'naturalisation rate', in other words, 
the ratio between the total number of citizenships granted and the foreign population in 
each country at the beginning of the year. In 2009 Sweden had the second highest 
naturalisation rate in the EU-27 with 5.3 acquisitions per 100 foreign residents while 
Denmark was 14th at a rate of 2.1.270 
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3.3.2 Denmark- Statsborgerskab 
Amendments to the Danish Nationality Act in 2002, 2005 and 2008 have largely restricted 
conditions for the acquisition of nationality for Third Country Nationals (TCNs). The 9-year 
residence requirement (up from the previous 7) for the first generation is one of the longest 
of all MIPEX countries and the level of expected language attainment is also the highest.271 
Other requirements for naturalisation include a statement of national loyalty, and 
renunciation of existing national citizenship. The conduct requirement dictates that 
migrants can be excluded from naturalisation on a permanent basis if they have been 
sentenced to imprisonment for eighteen months or more.  
Additionally, economic conditions for naturalisation require that applicants cannot have 
outstanding public debts and must be able to demonstrate economic self-sufficiency, 
meaning that the applicant has not received social benefits for more than six months within 
the last five years. Applicants for naturalisation also have to demonstrate a level of linguistic 
and cultural knowledge by passing a series of citizenship tests. Legislative changes in 2005 
included a revocation of second generation immigrants’ rights to naturalisation by 
declaration.272  Another particularity of Danish citizenship law is that decisions on 
naturalisation must be passed through Parliament, mentioning each of the applicants by 
name. After 2002, this was restricted to happening only twice annually which lengthened 
the citizenship application process.273 
As a result of these changes over the last decade, Danish citizenship law now has the highest 
barriers for naturalisation among the Nordic countries.274 This resulted in a dramatic fall in 
the number of naturalisations, with a 77.2% reduction in issued citizenship over the 
following year.275 
Goli and Rezaei note that “It has been a general perception, as naturalisation is based on the 
discretion of the Parliament, that no one has a right to Danish citizenship.”276In Denmark, 
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migrant integration programmes leading up to citizenship are mandatory and a lack of 
participation can lead to financial or legal penalisation. By contrast, Swedish migrant 
integration programmes are largely voluntary and are far less severe in their sanctions for 
nonparticipation.277 
The 2001 election campaign also signified a stark discursive turn in Danish political debate 
about citizenship. DF placed a full page newspaper advertisement in the Jyllands-Posten 
listing the names of five thousand immigrants who had recently been granted Danish 
citizenship in order to highlight the number of non-western migrants that were 
naturalising.278 According to DF, granting naturalisation to such a large number of foreigners 
would make Danes strangers in their own country and violated the national constitution.279 
DF have an objective of reducing the number of naturalisations to their ideal quota of 2000 
and explicitly reject the notion of citizenship as a means of integration.280 
These actions and statements drew condemnation and criticism from political opponents 
but in 2002 the newly elected centre-right government made several restrictive changes to 
the Danish Nationality Act.281 This example is reflective of the influence the DF has had on 
government policy direction and discourse during the 2000s.282 Unlike Sweden, Denmark 
has strongly rejected changing its policy of unitary citizenship 283 and the MIPEX naturalisation 
graph (1.3) shows that dual nationality is the area of citizenship policy where Denmark and 
Sweden vary most starkly. Currently, Danish law only allows dual citizenship for minors, 
stateless persons, refugees, or those who cannot be released from their national 
citizenship.284  The Danish parliament was prompted to debate dual citizenship in 2002 
shortly after Sweden had passed its new Citizenship act. However, all parties (with the 
exception of far-left minority Enhedslisten) argued in favour of maintaining unitary 
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citizenship in Denmark.285 During the debates, Conservative member Else Theill Sørensen 
argued: 
“That a person can have dual, maybe even several citizenships, which they can use as 
needed goes against the Conservative Party’s perception of the concept of citizenship and 
everything it entails. You cannot change citizenship like you change a shirt, and you usually 
only wear one shirt…”  
Jøregensen notes that the restrictive turn in Danish naturalisation policies, reflects an 
“underlying assimilation discourse behind both understandings of integration and 
perceptions of society…diversity is fundamentally based on the assumption that immigrants 
need to adapt to Danish norms.”286 
While outside of the timeframe of this thesis’ analysis, it is worth noting that the L-C 
government coalition was defeated by a new centre-left government in September 2011. 
This led to some speculation that the new government would reverse some of the previous 
government’s restrictive immigration and citizenship policies, like the controversial 24-year-
rule for spousal reunification.287 However the Social Democrat-led government has not 
over-turned this particular policy and early indications show that the government has little 
political scope to undo many of the previous government’s restrictions.288  This adds 
substance to Favell’s argument that national policy frameworks of migrant integration, once 
established, tend to be path-dependant in nature which restricts the future government 
decision-making options in these policy areas. 289 
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3.4 Summary: Divergent models – Assimilation and Multiculturalism 
In their legislative changes to the naturalisation requirements it is clear that Denmark and 
Sweden have varied in their expectations regarding migrants’ length of residence, linguistic 
ability, cultural assimilation, and level of exclusive loyalty and attachment to their host 
country. The dual citizenship case-study outlined above illustrates that Denmark maintains a 
national perspective of citizenship which emphasises the continued primacy of traditional 
nation-state based frameworks and the importance of bounded national communities. 
Sweden’s openness to dual citizenship reflects a more transnational and liberal attitude 
towards citizenship, recognising multiple identification and belonging. Insofar as citizenship 
legislation is “a well suited source for public self-presentation of the nation, and what is 
required to become a part of it”,290 it is clear that the official citizenship identities 
propagated by the Danish and Swedish governments extol rather different ideas about what 
it means to be a citizen, and what is expected of migrants who want to attain this status.  
A perceptible division between the migrant integration models can be seen in the objectives 
of Danish and Swedish naturalisation policy, namely, whether the extension of citizenship to 
newcomers should serve as a step in the overall integration process, or conversely, whether 
it should be the final reward for a fully integrated immigrant. Sweden’s comparatively liberal 
conditions for naturalisation (five year residence, no language requirement, acceptance of 
dual citizenship) indicate that citizenship is considered as a means to integration; a process 
which continues after the migrant has become naturalised. Conversely, Denmark’s rigorous 
testing of extended residence, behaviour, language, economic self-sufficiency, and national 
loyalty show that citizenship is considered to be the ends, rather than the means, of migrant 
integration.  Acquisition of citizenship is viewed as part of the integration process, and an 
aim of the new Act was to strengthen the status of citizenship as a part of integration.291 
The key differences in the two models are neatly summed up by Hedetoft who notes that: 
 “Danish homogeneity faces Swedish multiculturalism; a closed, exclusionary 
regime encounters one that is open and inclusive; assimilation contrasts with 
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official recognition of difference; ideas that frame “them” as the problem 
confront ideas framing the national society as a barrier to integration; welfare is 
variously projected as hindrance to or a path toward integration; “they” are seen 
as victims of or responsible for their own destiny; institutional rigidity faces 
flexible adaptation of institutions to new groups; and demands for single, 
exclusive citizenship stand in opposition to possibilities for multiple citizenship. In 
this light, the two countries are worlds apart.”292 
In this chapter I presented naturalisation policies as an empirical indicator that exemplifies 
the broader national citizenship policy regime. As the Danish and Swedish citizenship 
debates testifies, citizenship itself is an expression of the rights and obligations that 
accompany full membership of a society. This chapter has argued that the two countries’ 
divergent migrant integration policies reflect different models of national citizenship. As is 
alluded to above, and will be described in more detail in the following chapter, the 
respective governments frequently frame their migrant integration models and societal 
visions in contrast with one another to the point where the issue has become one of open 
political conflict. In the next chapter, I will argue that these divergent migrant integration 
models, and the resulting conflicts, have complicated cross-border integration efforts in the 
Øresund region by heightening conceptual and organisational borders between the two 
countries with respect to TCNs in the region.  
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Chapter Four: Citizenship Dilemmas in the Øresund Region 
 
The previous chapter empirically explored the migrant naturalisation policies of Denmark 
and Sweden, establishing that the former derives its citizenship policies from an 
assimilationist model, while the latter draws its policies from a multiculturalist model. But 
what, if any, affect does this policy divergence have on the goals and visions of regional 
integration and citizenship in the cross-border Øresund region as outlined in Chapter Two? 
This chapter illustrates how these officially purported views of what it means to become 
citizens, have created an area of political tension in the cross-border Øresund region, 
frustrating regional integration efforts. Parts of the analysis refer to the effects of divergent 
migrant naturalisation policies specifically, while others refer more broadly to the 
citizenship models as policy vehicles which direct the civil, social and political integration of 
migrants into the national community.   
In this chapter, I map out regional “citizenship dilemmas” according to whether they 
manifest as organisational borders to work and welfare or as conceptual borders of 
inclusion, exclusion, and entitlement. I establish that divergent migrant naturalisation 
policies, and the political tensions that these incite, have served to reinforce organisational 
barriers for TCNs in the region. The different political narratives of entitlement, diversity and 
belonging have heightened conceptual barriers not only between regional citizens and 
migrants, but also between Danish and Swedish political conceptions of citizenship. I 
suggest that these dilemmas of migrant integration and national citizenship have 
implications for the full realization of an inclusive, transnational community, as envisioned 
by Øresund promoters.  
 
4.1 Organisational borders of work and welfare 
Removing organisational borders to work and welfare has been one of the primary focuses 
of the Øresund Committee in their goal to achieve “A diverse, yet cohesive labour 
market”293. Many of the free movement obstacles identified in the 33 Barriers Report relate 
to cross-border hindrances to enjoying full labour market participation and access to social 
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security rights, particularly for cross-border commuters.294 The key issues I identify in this 
section regard the organisational inconsistencies of citizenship, and what implications these 
have if regional mobility rights are extended to TCNs. Divergent national citizenship policies 
in Denmark and Sweden raise two issues in this regard. The first, how national residence 
requirements for naturalisation will accommodate the normalization of regional mobility. 
The second refers to a broader citizenship dilemma– namely, how different national 
approaches to labour migration, and the extension of civic, social, political rights in the 
process, raise implications for the collective regional management of a diverse yet cohesive 
labour market. Thus, while territorial borders and organisational borders to labour market 
access are removed during integration, other organisational rules guarding entitlement to 
rights and citizenship can arise as an issue for regional integration  
4.1.1 TCN regional labour market access 
As presented in Chapter Two, one of the key barriers identified to achieving a fully 
integrated Øresund labour market is that of TCN rights to work on both sides of the Sound. 
As well as current economic losses, regional leaders are acting on figures that show a 
significant increase in foreign workers will be necessary over the next decade to fill regional 
labour shortages and sustain the welfare systems of both countries. 295 In addition to 
pointing out the implications of this barrier for the region’s growth and attractiveness, the 
report also asserts that the rule “hinders free movement for citizens of the Øresund 
Region.”296  
This on-going focus of the Øresund Committee into extending labour market rights to non-
EU residents297 is consistent with its goal of making the region “a model for how to make 
the best possible use of the resources that workers with a non-Scandinavian background can 
bring to the labour market”.298 The report noted that the issue of TCN mobility currently 
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rested with the Danish government, which is politically resistant to the idea. Øresund 
Committee Chair, Pia Kinhult, noted herself that Denmark’s restrictive immigration regime 
had made aspects of the Committee’s integration work more difficult: “We have had a wave 
of anti-immigration feeling in Denmark for instance that is very open that had influenced our 
work in the last few years.”299 
A number of Nordic actors have also previously advocated for extending common labour 
market rights to non-European residents in order to enhance the labour market potential 
and economic productivity of the wider region. Former Danish Prime Minister Poul Schlüter 
served as special envoy to the Nordic Council for reporting on the removal of cross-border 
obstacles in the Nordic Region. In his report “The Nordic Countries — One Workplace, One 
Market”, Schlüter proposes extending the joint Nordic labour market to include non-Nordic 
citizens with permanent work and residence permits.  
“I suggested a couple of years ago that non-Nordic citizens with permanent 
residence and work permits should be included under the joint Nordic labour 
market agreement. It has not been possible to reach political agreement on this 
point… As the content of the agreement will not be changed, it was decided to 
suspend this part of the work.”300 
Denmark had objected to TCN mobility on the basis that its special opt-out on EU Directives 
relating to TCN mobility made this free movement difficult. Danish Minister for Nordic 
Cooperation Flemming Hansen stated that “It would neither be appropriate nor particularly 
useful to prepare separate Nordic rules for Denmark, going beyond the EU rules at this 
point. Such a rule formation would imply discrimination between TCNs in the EU and those 
in Scandinavia. It would be difficult to explain, and the government does not wish to.”301 
However, when questioned during the 2003 Nordic Council Summit“…to answer the 
question why the Danish reservations about the EU suddenly have meaning for Nordic 
cooperation”, Hansen was forced to admit that there is nothing legally in the Danish opt-out 
arrangement that prevents it from having a separate Nordic agreement on the issue, but 
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“that it is purely a political issue”.302 This admission revealed that domestic political 
resistance was the main reason for the Danish government’s rejection of the proposal to 
allow TCN free movement within a common Nordic labour market. National immigration 
politics, in this instance, overrode a proposal for deeper regional integration between the 
Nordic countries’ labour markets.  
If freedom of movement for TCNs is eventually achieved however, questions arise about if, 
and how, national migrant naturalisation policies will adapt to accommodate this. 
Specifically, given that TCNs would be free to live, work and commute on either side of the 
bridge, how will this affect national residency requirements as one of the key criteria to be 
fulfilled for migrant naturalisation? As noted in Chapter Three, Denmark requires a continual 
residence period of nine years in the country for a migrant to be able to apply for 
naturalisation. In Sweden, the equivalent is five years. Yet if deeper integration is pursued, 
and TCNs find themselves living and working between the two countries, how would this 
affect their residency status and eligibility for citizenship? 
This relates back to Bauböck’s paradox referred to in Chapter Two about mobility being a 
key marker of regional citizenship, but an obstacle to attaining national citizenship which 
currently requires stable residence. One can already see this dilemma with Danes and 
Swedes trying to exercise their own citizenship rights on either side of the Sound. For 
example, Danes can only vote in national elections if they are normally resident in the 
country.303 A growing number of Danes living in Sweden and commuting to Denmark for 
work therefore lose one of their main political rights associated with citizenship. Similarly, 
Denmark’s policy of unitary citizenship means that Øresund citizens can have either Danish 
or Swedish citizenship – not both. Both of these points suggest that divergent national 
naturalisation rules and citizenship policies more generally, raise complications for the 
prospect of mobile Øresund citizens living, working and enjoying the full rights of citizenship 
on both sides of the Sound.   
A 2010 report into the Nordic countries’ regulations to recruit and retain foreign labour 
highlighted the need to strengthen the Nordic cooperation on TCN labour migration policy 
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and improve the region’s attractiveness to skilled workers.304 However, a common approach 
to a TCN labour migration policy has not yet been politically possible, and tensions are 
evident between Denmark and Sweden in this regard.  
The Mayor of Malmö, Ilmar Reepalu, has claimed that Danish xenophobia was ruining 
successful growth in the Øresund region. He claimed that the restrictive immigration and 
migrant integration approach of the Danish government discouraged qualified workers and 
international companies from investing their human and financial capital in the cross-border 
region.305 
“Denmark has branded itself as xenophobic, and that affects the whole Øresund 
region. A stain like that takes a long time to remove,” 306… “The OECD report that 
came in 2009 very clearly showed that the xenophobic attitude in Denmark has 
in many ways had a very bad impact on Danish society…The skilled workforce – 
they are coming and they are leaving because they feel, the family feel, that 
Denmark is not welcoming them.  We can't get enough skilled labour force 
coming from other countries… so today that is a serious problem….”307 
This view was also recently expressed by British economist Philippe Legrain, who said on a 
Danish news network interview that, “Denmark’s immigration rules make it very 
unattractive for talented migrants to come here, and when Canada and Australia are 
competing to get them and Britain is going to allow them in freely then clearly those rules 
need to be liberalised.”308 The 2008 'World Migration Barometer' study by the Economist 
Intelligence Unit (EIU) also points out that the Danish position in the indexes for accessibility 
for global talent, is not only ranked well below Sweden, Norway and the OECD average, but 
also lower than countries such as Venezuela, Cote D'Ivoire, Russia, Botswana and 
Kazakhstan.309 This case demonstrates that divergent national policies towards the rights 
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and entitlements of foreign nationals are having a negative effect on regional aims to foster 
a common “diverse, yet cohesive labour market.” 
Further to this, there are conceptual citizenship borders; in this case, the extent to which 
the national community considers migrant workers from foreign cultures ‘fit in’ to their 
society and the rights and entitlements that should be extended to them. In the ILO’s World 
Migration Report, the proportion of respondents agreeing that immigrants make a large 
contribution to the country shows significant difference between Danish and Swedish 
respondents; 79 per cent of Swedes agreed with the statement compared to only 45% in 
Denmark.310 The difference in national attitudes towards the role of migrants in economy 
and society goes some way to explaining why the two countries frequently criticise each 
other’s migrant integration and citizenship strategies.   
This lack of consensus about the role of migrants in the economy and society more generally 
is not only reflected in public opinion data but also in political rhetoric towards non-EU 
migrants. Contrast the two following political messages sent out by the respective Ministers 
for Integration in Denmark and Sweden about the desirability of foreign workers and how 
they should be accommodated and integrated: 
Immigrants from countries that resemble Denmark have better prerequisites for 
integrating into Danish society. This is an inescapable fact. For example, a quick 
glance at statistics show that immigrants from Western countries are working to 
a far greater extent than immigrants from non-Western countries… In my view, 
this is… sensible immigration politics, which deal objectively with the fact that 
different people have different prerequisites for integrating into Danish society. 
This is why we need to differentiate between nationalities. 311 Søren Pind, Danish 
Minister for Integration. 
“…One of the greatest challenges for Europe, and Sweden, and Denmark is to 
maintain open and tolerant societies. And what we have been seeing, which is 
deeply worrisome, in Denmark and other European countries is harsher attitudes 
towards immigration, less openness… Sweden, and the Swedish government, is 
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standing out a little bit in Europe for the moment, stressing that we will continue 
to be open and tolerant; both for the solidarity… but also because it’s going to 
make us richer in 15 or 20 years.”312  Eric Ullenhag, Swedish Minister for 
Integration. 
Ullenhag expressed his opposition to the anti-immigration directions of neighbouring 
Denmark, asserting that Sweden will have an advantage in the region and the world due to 
its openness to immigration and the resulting international presence. This discrepancy will 
be salient in future given that the Øresund region projects much of its growth to stem from 
the attraction, retention and cross-border mobility of foreign migrants.  
4.1.2 Cross-border welfare entitlements 
This section identifies how divergent national citizenship policies generate different levels of 
social entitlement for TCNs in the region, depending on which country they naturalise in. 
Liberalisation of access to Swedish citizenship and restriction of access to Danish citizenship, 
as described in Chapter Three, has created a situation whereby migrants on the Swedish 
side of the Øresund are able to naturalise quickly and easily compared to their migrant 
counterparts in Denmark.  
Paraphrasing Bauböck’s example of the “inequality and exclusion EU citizenship 
dilemma”313, I use the hypothetical example of two migrants: one gaining residence in 
Sweden, the other in Denmark. After five years residence and minimal naturalisation 
requirements the migrant in Sweden has the right to become a Swedish citizen. Due to EU 
citizenship and the Nordic Social Security Convention this migrant is now free to reside, 
work, and access social rights in Denmark on par with Danish citizens.314  The migrant who 
originally gained residence in Denmark however, would still have another four years of 
residence to prove, plus language and citizenship tests, before being able to naturalise and 
gain the same regional entitlements. Additionally, the Danish government’s “economic self-
sufficiency” requirement for naturalisation means that if the migrant in Denmark has to 
utilise social welfare for more than six months, this will delay access to citizenship further. 
By contrast, Sweden’s legislation dictates no such precondition of economic independence. 
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This not only creates the citizenship dilemma of “inequality and exclusion” referred to by 
Bauböck, but also serves as a key point of bilateral tension between Denmark and Sweden.  
Sweden’s liberal naturalisation laws have sparked criticism from Denmark, particularly DF, 
about “backdoor migration”, whereby immigrants who might not otherwise have been 
granted residence and citizenship in Denmark can enjoy national social rights anyway vis-à-
vis the ‘backdoor’ entry of the more liberal Swedish citizenship.315 DF received political 
attention in 2005 when it called for disestablishment of the Nordic Social Security 
Convention in order to protect the Danish welfare from backdoor migration. 
From DF Foreign Affairs Spokesperson, Søren Espersen: 
“Annually, ten-thousands of Turks, Pakistanis, Iraqis, Iranians, Palestinians, 
Moroccans, Libyans, Lebanese and other Arabs -in droves- get a Swedish 
passport… What good is all the hard work that the Danish People's Party and the 
government does to stop mass immigration, if  the worlds refugees can, after 
just after a few years' residence in Sweden as Swedish citizens, slip into Denmark 
through the back door? … Today, I see Sweden is as much a threat to Denmark as 
Turkey…. the moment that the Swedish welfare system breaks down - and it will– 
there will be every reason for them to move over the bridge. Thus, the Swedish 
people’s problem is also the Danish people's problem and I thereby call on the 
Danish People's Party to soon reformulate its Nordic politics.”316 
This statement reveals two things; firstly, that DF perceives naturalised Swedish citizens, 
particularly those from Arab countries, as less eligible for cross-border rights vis-à-vis the 
Nordic Social Security convention than other Swedish citizens. One could paraphrase 
Orwell’s notion here as “all citizens are equal, but some citizens are more equal than 
others.”317  
Secondly, the reference to the breakdown of the Swedish welfare system reveals what 
Crepaz describes as a primordial claim about the viability of the welfare state in the context 
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of immigration and cultural diversity. Such an argument claims that too much immigration 
into a welfare state, and a lack of integration of these migrants, undermines the national 
sense of collective social fate. This in turn affects the willingness of people to contribute 
towards a welfare system that supports a community of “strangers.”318  Within such a 
scenario the welfare state becomes untenable and breaks down. While neither national 
Government heeded DF’s calls, the political statements alone are enough to suggest an 
underlying dissatisfaction among some groups about the interdependencies of regional 
integration and the way in which national immigration, citizenship and welfare policies 
become entwined in the process. In this sense, the disparity between national citizenship 
policies can be seen to have regional political repercussions. 
Through the Nordic Council, the Scandinavian countries have taken some cooperative steps 
to identify modern challenges, including immigration issues, to which the Nordic welfare 
model needs to adapt. One of the questions raised relates to how immigration affects the 
basic premise of the Nordic welfare model, such as equality, universal benefits, and cultural 
homogeneity.319 Similar to Creapz’s observation, this debate reflects what Hedetoft 
describes as the “Welfare State - Immigration Nexus”, where, “In the Scandinavian context, 
cultural acceptance and access to political rights are thus intertwined, with equality 
interpreted to mean both cultural similarity and political sameness...”320 The Council has had 
less success, however, in getting the Nordic governments to coordinate their migration and 
citizenship policies, despite calls for cooperation from many Members on the Nordic 
Council.321  
As noted in Chapter Two, there is interplay between territorial, organisational and 
conceptual borders to free movement, and the DF case is an example where different 
Danish normative notions of belonging and entitlement (conceptual borders) were 
heightened due to the perception of low organisational barriers to Swedish citizenship. In 
response, DF called for an organisational border (disentitlement to Danish social security) to 
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be re-erected between the Nordic neighbours. This not only demonstrates the regional 
issues that can arise over divergent naturalisation policies but also different national 
conceptions of entitlement and belonging. The next section explores more deeply how 
divergent national citizenship models outlined in Chapter Three have enforced conceptual 
borders within the Øresund region, frustrating regional integration and identity strategy 
efforts.  
 
4.2 Conceptual borders of belonging and identity 
Efforts to increase mobility across national borders in the Øresund region have raised 
important questions about migrant naturalisation and conceptions of citizenship. The latter 
half of this chapter explores how political strains over divergent national citizenship issues 
are reflective of a conceptual border between the two government’s officially purported 
views about who belongs to the national community. This highlights how citizenship can be 
understood not merely as a set of formal regulations, but also as a construction of national 
identity, which has implications for the emergence of a common Øresund citizenship in the 
cross-border region.  
4.2.1 Conceptual borders between citizens and foreign nationals in the Øresund 
region 
The Øresund Region as a ‘contact zone’ of different cultures is promoted as a synergy of 
creativity and ideas with the potential to boost economic performance. 322The Øresund 
Committee maintains that “All project work is undertaken with respect for the social and 
cultural identities represented in the region.”323 Yet some have argued that Øresund 
political leaders attempt to frame regional citizenship in a way that avoids politicising 
unwanted forms of mobility in order to maximise their political efforts to enhance cross-
border freedom of movement.324 For example, Nillson notes how “Immigrants comprise a 
rather large percentage of the imagined future Øresund region; nevertheless, people rarely 
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speak of them as active participants in the regional project.” 325 Such claims point out the 
undemocratic side effect that non-Scandinavian immigrants are written out of the regional 
narrative, despite the fact that they have a strong presence in the region and are one of the 
most mobile groups.326 Nilsson notes how: 
“The movement of most Swedes and Danes in the region stands, in this sense, in 
stark contrast to the situation faced by non EU-immigrants. Rhythms of 
perpetual movement taken by non EU-immigrants are more often than not 
framed as a threat to the sanctity of national culture and an impending source of 
its contamination from without.”327 
The suspicion of TCN movement within the region by some Danish national political groups 
suggests the existence of a fundamental identity and trust basis upon which free travel 
agreements are founded. Despite the economic incentives of free movement, it appears 
that deep conflicts can arise within regional arrangement over the geographical scope, 
membership and identity of the region when divergences arise about who deserves free 
movement and citizenship privileges in the region. This raises questions about regional 
citizenship, and how inclusive of cultural differences it can be.   
Part of the reason for this regional tension is that Denmark and Sweden have reacted very 
differently within their own domestic political contexts to the viability of multiculturalism 
and diversity for national citizenship. Take the following recent statements by the Ministers 
of Integration in Denmark and Sweden about multiculturalism:  
“We have a debate in Europe for the moment concerning multiculturalism. We 
have in Denmark, long speeches concerning multiculturalism…. For me I worry 
about this trend because it’s more or less a way of questioning immigration and 
openness more than multiculturalism.  I want to be crystal-clear on one point: 
Sweden is a multicultural country… The diversity of Sweden is positive.... It's no 
problem that we have different religions in Sweden… that we have all those 
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languages spoken in Sweden is a richness and it is of course a great 
advantage.”328Swedish Minister of Integration, Eric Ullenhag, 2011 
“My approach is that when you choose Denmark, you choose Denmark because 
you want to be Danish. In my view, multiculturalism, and the track it travels on, 
is beginning to crack -and I will fight it all I can.” 329, Danish Minister of 
Integration, Søren Pind, 2011 
These discordant national political attitudes to multiculturalism are significant for analysing 
citizenship dilemmas in the region. If Swedish migrant naturalisation policy derives from a 
multiculturalist model, and Danish policies from an assimilationist model, this suggests two 
different sets of expectations of how migrants should adapt to national society. For 
example, many of the organisational work and welfare issues outlined in the previous 
section can represent deeper conceptual assumptions about the effects of multiculturalism 
on economic and social stability. As Geddes notes, “Conceptual borders of belonging and 
identity can reinforce territorial and organisational borders and have tended, in the area of 
migration and asylum, to have a strong national focus.” When heightened, these conceptual 
understandings can result in calls for the reinstating of organisational or territorial borders 
in order to protect the accepted national boundaries, for example, DF demands to revoke 
the Nordic social security convention.  
In the same way, domestic political discourse about citizenship and diversity not only affects 
internal politics, but also how the nation-state itself perceives its own identity and 
relationship to the rest of world. In the Danish case, political supporters of the government’s 
restrictive stance on immigration frame Denmark as a European leader in pragmatic 
migration and citizenship management: 
“Denmark has nothing to be ashamed of. Quite the contrary. We are the first in 
Europe by reversing a trend which many had condemned as inevitable and part 
of the development. Denmark responds to the challenges the world are asking 
today. Denmark is a pioneer in openly discussing the problems that a mindless 
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immigration to the old European nation states has caused.”330 Pia Kjærsgaard, 
DF Party Leader 
By contrast, Swedish Integration Minister Eric Ullenhag speaks of Swedish migration policy 
as representing a long standing pillar of multiculturalism and human decency: 
“… I’m proud of a Sweden that has been open to refugees for quite a long while.  
Sweden was one of the countries that was fairly open when almost all Europe 
betrayed humanity…. In the Swedish government we are extremely clear on 
some things: We will continue to be open, we won’t go on the same path as you 
see in some European countries.”331  
Focusing on matters of regional citizenship and cross-border governance in the Øresund 
therefore requires attention to clashes in official Danish and Swedish attitudes towards 
immigrants. Gregg Bucken-Knapp speaks of a “potential clash between a highly restrictive 
programmatic set of Danish beliefs towards immigrants and foreigners, and a multi-cultural 
Øresund population”332 when he assesses the possibility of cross-border governance of the 
region. He notes that these issues become particularly salient if Øresund integration moves 
beyond economic development into political spheres of cross-border rights and governance. 
To negotiate regional citizenship in such a case would require coming to a cross-border 
agreement about multiculturalism – a feat which would be very difficult in the current tense 
political climate between Denmark and Sweden. To re-cite Geddes “Conceptual borders 
though more nebulous are no less important because notions of entitlement, belonging and 
identity may function as significant boundaries between domestic systems of governance 
and the scope for European integration to penetrate that system.”333 
Bucken-Knapp sums the situation up well when he states, “…there is the likelihood that if 
sharp differences continue to exist between the two states over the immigration issue, then 
the cross-border Øresund region, where immigrants are also highly visible, has the ability to 
provide the source for a rather interesting boundary dispute: not over the comparative 
worth of Danish or Swedish national identities, but over the identities and rights of the 
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‘others’ who call the Øresund their home.”334 The presence of migrants in the Øresund 
region challenges regional leaders to develop new understandings of regional membership, 
though the question of who does or does not belong to a region may become a highly 
politicised question. 
4.2.2 Conceptual divides between Danish and Swedish governments on migration 
and citizenship issues. 
Although an external view of the Nordic countries often assumes cultural homogeneity, 
many from within the region would highlight significant differences between national 
cultures. Lamont and Molnár note that “The relational construction of national similarities 
and differences is particularly apparent in border regions between nation states.”335 In his 
article, “A train-ride away but still worlds apart”, Bucken-Knapp not only confirms many of 
these significant national differences, but argues that the facilitation of free movement 
often has the reverse effect of heightening national differences and stereotypes as they 
become more apparent through regular contact and cohabitation.336 This section shows that 
one particular national difference that has become heightened in this process is divergent 
national attitudes to migrant naturalisation. This in turn has raised a conceptual border 
between the countries that complicates deeper regional integration.  
Political commentators and media have been quick to pick up on the political strains which 
have emerged over migration policy divergences between the two countries over the last 
decade. In February 2011, an “Open letter to Denmark from Sweden” 337 by a Swedish 
journalist was published in leading Danish newspaper Politiken as a debate piece to reflect 
Swedish sentiments about Danish immigration politics.  
“Dear brother, what’s happening? 
It seems like you, in the last few years, have lost your footing….Before you were 
known for your openness. With your hearty laughter you embraced the multi-
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cultural and diversity. Your policy was enviable seen with big brother Sweden's 
eyes. 
…Why are you letting the debate about Muslims lead to witch hunts? What is the 
reason that immigrants have become a symbol of evil…? 
…The ideals that we grew up with, seems to have gone out of your body. The 
democratic freedoms and rights, fundamental to everyone, they mean nothing? 
…Dear brother, you can still turn back. Reopen your arms, you do not need to be 
afraid. I found even at your side, you can still choose to do the right thing. 
Sincerely, Your brother, Sweden” 
 
In response, Politiken published a response letter by a Danish journalist338: 
“Dear Sweden.  
Thank you for your letter. It's nice to know that your brother cares about how 
things stand. But frankly, brother, I wish that you could see the plank in your own 
eye before sending anxious letters about the splinter in mine. 
…The only thing I heard from you was an accusatory cries of racism from the 
other side of the strait… With you, my dear brother, I see no debate, no religion, 
no discussion about what Islam is and what religion can cause. Even when a 
suicide bomber jumped in Stockholm, I couldn’t hear you discuss this topic… 
I see you censor election videos if you do not like them…I see you pointing at 
people and calling them 'racists' if they disagree with you… I see you cleanse 
meaningful dissent through intimidation, demonization, social stigma and 
power.  
Dear brother, will you please try to clean up your own house first? It's not too 
late.  
Sincerely, Your brother, Denmark.” 
The excerpts above show the salience of this immigration politics division in public debate 
between the two countries. While such examples reflect deliberately provocative positions, 
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they provide a demonstration of the type of policy contrasting that has come to characterise 
the Swedish – Danish immigration debate. Petersson summarises how, “In Sweden the 
image prevails of Denmark as a den of intolerance, racism, and xenophobia, whereas 
Sweden is depicted in Denmark as a land of multiculturalism and political correctness, 
where people’s real opinions about immigration and multiculturalism are not allowed to be 
articulated.” 339 
In this domain, far-right parties have been extremely divisive, not only in their policies as 
outlined above, but also in the nationalist rhetoric that they employ. Far-right political 
parties such as DF and the Swedish Democrats “mobilize voters around a core nativist 
message: Sweden belongs to the Swedes and Denmark to the Danes”.340 This was expressed 
quite vividly by DF’s Leader Pia Kjærsgaard when she stated “If the Swedish government 
wants to transform Sweden… into a Scandinavian Beirut with clan wars, killings and mass 
rapes, then let them do it. We can always put a barrier on the Øresund Bridge…”.341  
Thus, we can see that the divergent national citizenship models - assimilationism and 
multiculturalism - have fostered a discursive process of national “othering” which has raised 
stereotypical notions about the incompatibility of Danish and Swedish nationality, and the 
implications this has for cross-border cooperation. The conceptual barrier in this case 
reflects different national perceptions of “self” which interact with the integration process 
and impact on the interests and identities of states and individuals involved.342 Differences 
in national migrant naturalisation policies have heightened conceptual boundaries not only 
between migrants and Scandinavian citizens in the region but also between Danish and 
Swedish identities and national outlooks towards migration and diversity.  Divergent 
national citizenship models therefore suggest implications for the concept of an Øresund 
citizenship built on commonly agreed principles about the long-term conditions of diversity 
and inclusion in the region.  
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As Geddes suggests, conceptual borders ‘”boil down to the question of ‘who are we’ and 
then, by extension the issue of how these self-understandings affect attitudes to migrant 
new comers.”343 If the Danish government conceptions of “being Danish”, and how this 
manifests in citizenship policy and discourse, is perceived as being incompatible with what 
the Swedish government considers “being Swedish” vis-à-vis naturalisation, then what is the 
likelihood of Danes and Swedes coming to an agreement about what is an ‘Øresund citizen’, 
particularly when faced with collective questions about migration management in a cross-
border region?  
 
4.3 Discussion: Effects of conceptual borders of national citizenship in the 
Øresund region 
Returning to the question posed at the start of the chapter, this discussion section assesses 
what effects, if any, national citizenship policy divergence has on the goals and visions of 
regional integration and citizenship in the Øresund region as outlined in Chapter Two. It is 
important to note that issues of national citizenship policy are unlikely to have an impact on 
some of the more immediate questions of regional integration. Efforts to further cross-
border commercial integration such as cross-border vehicle registration and 
apprenticeships, or flat telephone rates and standardised bank fees344 have little connection 
to political issues of citizenship. But several key integration strategies which raise questions 
about rights and belonging, such as TCN mobility and regional identity, do become 
problematic in the context of divergent national naturalisation policies.  
The section framing organisational borders illustrated how divergent national systems for 
the integration and naturalisation of migrant labour can frustrate regional efforts to create a 
“diverse, yet cohesive labour market” that makes the most of migrant populations in the 
region. More broadly, this brings up questions over collective management regarding the 
rights and conditions extended to migrants in the region, and how they, along with other 
mobile Øresund citizens, can attain and fully utilise the rights-bearing status of citizenship. 
As alluded to in Chapter Two, this becomes particularly salient when one considers the 
significant number of TCNs living in the Øresund region, and the fact that part of the 
                                                          
343
 Geddes, Immigration and European Integration, 26. 
344
 Öresund Committee, ‘33 Hindringer, Udfordringer Og Muligheder: Oresundsmodellen 2010’. 
  
93 
 
Øresund Committee’s regional growth model is based on the attraction of more non-
European nationals to the region. 
Regarding conceptual borders, this chapter showed that political clashes over divergent 
national citizenship models have raised conceptual borders of belonging and entitlement 
between citizens and foreigners in the region, and also between Danes and Swedes 
themselves, as regional leaders attempt to deepen integration. Berg and Löfgren similarly 
note that, “Today there is a lot of public debate about cultural differences, as an “othering” 
of those “on the other side of the Øresund“ raises fears of ingrained antagonisms and 
“barriers of understanding”. In the process, imagined and real differences are reified into 
“Swedishness” and “Danishness”…”.345  
These conceptual borders are problematic for the Øresund Committee’s identity strategy as 
outlined in Chapter Two. The OECD’s report on the region noted that, “To strengthen the 
region’s competitive position, the OECD recommends the adoption of a broader, pan-
Øresund mind-set to promote integration and develop cross-border collaboration.”346 
Similarly, Hospers’ research on Øresund regional integration and branding notes that “If the 
Øresund Region wants to continue its economic growth, it is important for the authorities to 
pay attention to the lacking regional identity among the population across the borders.… 
besides physical and legal borders they experience a mental border that may seriously 
temper the development of a shared cross-border feeling.”347 Most of the mental barriers 
acknowledged by regional actors and academics so far have related to banal cultural 
differences and distinct administrative or corporate traditions.348 Bucken-Knapp is one of 
few academics that also flags the issue of divergent immigration politics as a potential 
source of cultural “othering” that may affect the regional integration process.  
Deeper issues for Øresund integration exist, then, if the region is to indeed become the 
‘Human Capital of Scandinavia’ and an attractive transnational market for international 
talent. If we consider the implication that cross-border regions, no matter the transnational 
image they may promote, are entrenched in national frameworks, then certain limitations 
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must be acknowledged. If the Danish government has profiled its naturalisation policy on 
the basis of restricting immigrants and foreign cultures, and in contrast to ‘the Swedish 
situation’, then what are the prospects that the future Øresund region will emphasise the 
prominence and potential of its immigrant populations? As the “Human Capital” title 
suggests, the Øresund inhabitants (Danish, Swedish or otherwise) are themselves the most 
significant regional assets, as it is through their cross-border participation that the region 
can flourish. As expressed by Bucken-Knapp, deeper integration “has the ability to provide 
the source for a rather interesting boundary dispute: not over the comparative worth of 
Danish or Swedish national identities, but over the identities and rights of the ‘others’ who 
call the Øresund their home.”349 
Citizenship policies in this sense have more than just a domestic impact. There are 
significant repercussions beyond national borders due to the regional implications of cross-
border integration. My argument here is that, far from being a policy area of exclusively 
national concern, divergent citizenship models have significant implications for the 
conceptualisation of a functional regional citizenship as envisaged by Øresund proponents. 
To paraphrase Bauböck, taking Øresund citizenship seriously means a shared understanding 
of who the future citizens of the Øresund are going to be.350 
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Chapter Five: Conclusion 
 
In setting out to answer the research question, To what extent do divergent national 
citizenship models inhibit deeper cross-border integration and prospects for regional 
citizenship?, this thesis first lay the conceptual ground work for examining the relationship, 
and tensions, between national citizenship and regional integration. It revealed a number of 
practical and conceptual ‘citizenship dilemmas’ which have occurred at the EU level in this 
clash between regional freedom of movement and national self-determination over 
citizenship policies. The second chapter outlined the case-study of the Øresund region, 
asserting that the depth of current and projected integration makes it ideal for exploring the 
effects of divergent national citizenship policies on cross-border integration, and what 
implications these could suggest for Europe more widely. As the Øresund region illustrates, 
the geographical and cultural proximity of these Nordic neighbours is no guarantee of 
seamless movement and cross-border integration.  
Chapter Three empirically explored divergent migrant naturalisation policies in Denmark 
and Sweden, determining that the former derives its citizenship policies from an 
assimilationist model, while the latter draws its policies from a multiculturalist model. 
Sweden has increasingly come to identify itself as a multicultural state with a responsibility 
to adjust its own society and culture to others and to processes of globalisation. Denmark, 
on the other hand has, over the period examined, come to define itself around resistance to 
multiculturalism and globalisation. In Denmark, the attainment of citizenship is seen as the 
ends of full integration, whereas in Sweden it is seen as a means of integration. 
The final chapter substantively addressed the crux of the research question in order to 
assess how these divergent national citizenship models inhibit deeper cross-border 
integration and prospects for regional citizenship. My initial hypothesis anticipated that 
such divergence would result in political conflict between member states over regional 
integration processes that highlight the status and entitlements of foreigners, thus 
complicating prospects for regional citizenship. This thesis found that while divergent 
national migrant citizenship models are unlikely to have any impact on some of the more 
immediate consumer-based questions of regional integration, such as bridge tolls, several 
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key integration strategies do become problematic in the context of divergent national 
naturalisation policies. I assessed how regional tensions over divergent national approaches 
to migrant integration reflected different national organisational structures and 
expectations regarding migrants’ labour market participation, access to citizenship status, 
and welfare entitlements. Findings showed that these discordant national citizenship 
policies can inhibit the regional aim of achieving a “diverse, yet cohesive labour market”, 
and particularly the goal of extending full regional labour mobility to TCNs. 
Additionally, the analysis revealed that political clashes over the divergent national 
citizenship models have highlighted conceptual borders of belonging and entitlement 
between citizens and foreigners in the region and also between Danish and Swedish 
approaches to diversity management. A distinctive finding of this thesis is that divergent 
national citizenship models, in the context of intensified integration, have fostered a process 
of national “othering” which has raised stereotypical notions about the incompatibility of 
Danish and Swedish nationality and identity. I suggested that these differences could have 
implications for the realisation of a regional citizenship based on a shared understanding of 
who the future citizens of the Øresund are going to be.  One avenue of further research in 
this field could be to examine how ideational forces, such as national citizenship models, 
affect the identities and interests of state actors in the regional integration process. Such an 
approach could make a valuable contribution to constructivist literature which assesses how 
self-images interact with, and impact on, material incentives.  
A recurring theme throughout this thesis, informed by Geddes’ border typologies 
framework, has been that national borders of citizenship can manifest in different ways. 
National boundaries of entitlement to work, welfare and naturalisation determine a 
community of legitimate receivers of state benefits in a way that has an organisational 
dimension (formal entitlement) which is reinforced by a conceptual dimension defining who 
deserves and who is entitled. This is related to ‘citizenship’ as both a social institutional and 
legal status and as a signifier of national membership and identity. This is salient for political 
studies of regional integration as it shows that boundary disputes have moved from being 
about tangible, territorial border security to more nuanced barriers of national rights, 
entitlements and identities. Such borders exist not only between member states, but 
between citizens and foreigners within the state and the region.  My research findings 
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suggest that fundamental political dilemmas of migrant integration and diversity 
management are not specific to the nation state but can also manifest in cross-border 
regions, challenging theoretical arguments outlined in Chapter One that the emergent 
regional forms of citizenship are more inclusive of TCNs.  
The findings and analysis of this thesis have highlighted issues similar to several EU 
citizenship dilemmas outlined in Chapter One and contribute to wider discussions about the 
challenges of migration management and cross-border integration at macro-regional or 
supra-regional levels. My analysis is consistent with academic observations that citizenship 
has become a volatile policy area. This thesis demonstrated that not only does this have 
domestic impact, but it can also become a point of tension between member states, 
implicating regional integration efforts. Thus, when it comes to regional integration, it 
matters not only how the countries tackle the organisational and conceptual boundaries 
between each of their national systems, but also how each nation-state organises its 
internal borders in relation to foreigners entering from outside the region. 
This speaks to a wider debate about the relationship between regional integration and 
national determination of citizenship policies. While functional theories of policy 
harmonisation in Chapter One allude to the influence of supranational integration on 
domestic policy making, this thesis also demonstrated that domestic citizenship policies and 
politics can conversely challenge processes of regional integration. This two-way causation 
suggests a dynamic process whereby national citizenship both challenges, and is challenged 
by, processes of regional integration.   
While my research question does not petition solutions to these regional citizenship 
dilemmas, the findings of this thesis back up Bauböck’s assertion that the introduction of 
European standards for citizenship of member states, whether via harmonisation or open 
coordination, needs to occur in order to prevent regional conflicts over who the future 
regional citizens are going to be. Like states, regional entities also have to develop rules and 
discursive legitimation for how to deal with issues of belonging, entitlement and cultural 
diversity. The challenge for regions will be how member states politically negotiate how 
inclusive or exclusive their region should be. This suggests the need for more active 
measures supporting regional dialogue on migrant integration issues when integration is 
well advanced, institutionalized, and expanding, particularly into political spheres. The issue 
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becomes more pressing if Europe, like the Øresund region, recognises immigration as a key 
part of its demographic future and regional growth strategy. 
Here, it is also useful to also acknowledge the limits of my argument. The first relate to the 
level of analysis, where I have predominantly focused on political actors. My arguments 
therefore cannot extend to making claims about other actors in the region such as business 
or interest groups, civil society or even migrant groups themselves. Additional research into 
these various actors, who are also vital to the integration process, may give a more 
comprehensive picture of all the forces at play. Secondly, there are also some limitations to 
how generalisable the findings of this thesis are to other border regions. I suggested that 
the cultural similarity of the two countries involved in the Øresund, as well as the region’s 
status as a leading AEBR exemplar, meant that this case study was ideal for testing emerging 
notions of regional citizenship. But precisely because the Øresund is a European leader in 
terms of its identity strategy and cultural integration, some findings about inhibited identity 
building may not yet be applicable to border regions still engaged in the administrative 
practicalities of integration. Comparative research with the Øresund and another ‘other 
border region’ facing similar issues could be fruitful in further understanding the 
mechanisms that enable or constrain cross-border integration when it comes to sensitive 
nationalised policy area such as citizenship. 
This research does contribute however to wider literature on the tension between regional 
freedom of movement and national determination over citizenship. The Øresund region 
demonstrated many of the same European citizenship dilemmas as outlined in Chapter One 
and also highlights the issues that can arise over different forms of wanted and unwanted 
mobility within regional arrangements. This mobility paradox pits traditional notions of 
citizenship based on a sedentary population conflict against the inherently mobile 
conceptions of free movement and regional citizenship.  
Chapter One noted how regional efforts to enhance the free movement of labour remain 
strikingly limited when compared to those driving the liberalisation of trade in goods, capital 
and services. Unlike the trade of commodities, the free movement of people brings into 
question the social and political rights of migrants, and the pressures that demographic 
changes can have on sovereignty and national citizenship. This relates to the oft quoted 
remark by Swiss writer, Max Frisch, on labour migration to Europe, “Wir riefen Arbeitskräfte 
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und es kamen Menscchen (we asked for manpower and we got human beings)”.351 In the 
same way, the word-play in the regional brand “The Human Capital of Scandinavia” is a 
fitting refrain for the paradox the region faces when it comes to deeper integration. Do 
political leaders envision the region as a capital city of humanity, extending rights and 
inclusion to all who reside there? Or are Øresund citizens those who fit into specific national 
criteria and are rewarded based on their contribution to economic growth? The real test of 
the Human Capital of Scandinavia may be how regional leaders reconcile these dilemmas in 
the pursuit of a common Øresund citizenship.  
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Hans Wallmark  Swedish MP, Nordic Council Member  
Minna Lindberg  Nordic Youth Council President 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
102 
 
Bibliography  
 
AEBR. ‘Association of European Border Regions’, n.d. http://www.aebr.eu/en/index.php. 
———. ‘Sail of Papenburg - Association of European Border Regions (AEBR)’, 
http://www.aebr.eu/en/sail_of_papenburg/region_award.php. 
———. ‘Statement on the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on Specific Provisions for the Support from the European Regional Development Fund to the 
European Territorial Cooperation Goal’. AEBR, November 4, 2011. 
Aradau, Claudia, Jef Huysmans, and Vicki Squire. ‘Acts of European Citizenship: A Political Sociology 
of Mobility’. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 48, no. 4 (August 2010): 945–965. 
Arter, David. Scandinavian Politics Today. Manchester University Press, 1999. 
———. Scandinavian Politics Today (2ed). Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008. 
Bache, Ian, and Matthew V. Flinders. Multi-Level Governance. Oxford University Press, 2005. 
Bale, Tim, Christoffer Green-Pedersen, André Krouwel, Kurt Richard Luther, and Nick Sitter. ‘If You 
Can’t Beat Them, Join Them? Explaining Social Democratic Responses to the Challenge from 
the Populist Radical Right in Western Europe’. Political Studies 58, no. 3 (June 2009): 410–
426. 
Balibar, Étienne. We, the People of Europe?: Reflections on Transnational Citizenship. Princeton 
University Press, 2004. 
Bauböck, Rainer. ‘Towards a Political Theory of Migrant Transnationalism’. International Migration 
Review 37, no. 3 (September 1, 2003): 700–723. 
———. Transnational Citizenship: Membership and Rights in International Migration. E. Elgar, 1994. 
———. ‘Who Are the Citizens of Europe?’ Eurozine, 2007. http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2006-
12-23-baubock-en.html. 
Benhabib, Seyla. ‘Borders, Boundaries, and Citizenship’. PS: Political Science & Politics 38, no. 04 
(2005): 673–677. 
Benito, Miguel. ‘Chapter 25: Sweden’. In European Immigration: a Sourcebook, edited by Anna 
Triandafyllidou and Ruby Gropas, 335–346. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2007. 
Berg, Per-Olof, Anders Linde-Laursen, and Orvar Lofgren. Invoking a Transnational Metropolis: The 
Making of the Oresund Region. Copenhagen Business School Press, 2000. 
Bernitz, Hedvig Lorkrantz. ‘Country Report: Sweden’. EUDO Citizenship Observatory: European 
University Institute, Florence, 2010. 
Bernström, Peter Weibull, and Inger René. ‘Motion to Parliament 1996/97: Sf622 Dual Citizenship’. 
Riksdagen, 1996. 
Blatter, Joachim. ‘Debordering the World of States: Toward a Multi-level System in Europe Ans a 
Multi-polity System in North America? Insights from Border Regions’. In State/Space: A 
Reader, edited by Neil Brenner, Bob Jessop, Martin Jones, and Gordon Macleod. 1st ed. 
Wiley-Blackwell, 2003. 
———. ‘From “spaces of Place” to “spaces of Flows”? Territorial and Functional Governance in 
Cross‐border Regions in Europe and North America’. International Journal of Urban and 
Regional Research 28, no. 3 (September 1, 2004): 530–548. 
Bloemraad, Irene, Anna Korteweg, and Gökçe Yurdakul. ‘Citizenship and Immigration: 
Multiculturalism, Assimilation, and Challenges to the Nation-State’. Annual Review of 
Sociology 34, no. 1 (2008): 153–179. 
Boeri, Tito, and Herbert Brücker. ‘Migration, Coordination Failures, and EU Enlargement’. IZA DP No. 
1600, May 2005. 
Boeri, Tito. ‘Migration Policy and the Welfare State’. Tilburg, 2006. 
Bosniak, Linda. ‘Citizenship Denationalized’. Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 7 (2000). 
Bourdieu, Pierre. Language and Symbolic Power. MA: Harvard University Press, 1991. 
  
103 
 
Brochmann, Grete, and Anniken Hagelund. Immigration Policy and the Scandinavian Welfare State 
1945-2010. Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. 
Brochmann, Grete, and Idunn Seland. ‘Citizenship Policies and Ideas of Nationhood in Scandinavia’. 
Citizenship Studies 14, no. 4 (2010): 429–443. 
Brubaker, Rogers. Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany. Harvard University Press, 
1992. 
Castells, Manuel. Rise of the Network Society. John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, 1996. 
Castles, Stephen, and Mark J Miller. The age of migration : international population movements in 
the modern world. Basingstoke [u.a.]: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. 
Castles, Stephen, and Mark J. Miller. The Age of Migration. Guilford Press, 2003. 
Charles Westin. ‘Migration Information Source - Sweden: Restrictive Immigration Policy and 
Multiculturalism’, n.d. http://www.migrationinformation.org/Profiles/display.cfm?ID=406. 
Collett, Elizabeth. ‘Faltering Movement: Explaining Europe’s Schengen Struggle’. Migration 
Information Source, November 2011. 
http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?ID=859. 
Crepaz, Markus M. L. Trust Beyond Borders: Immigration, the Welfare State, And Identity in Modern 
Societies. University of Michigan Press, 2008. 
Danish and Swedish Governments. ‘Øresund - En Region Bliver Til’. State Publications, 1999. 
http://www.evm.dk/resources/oem/static/publikationer/html/oresund/hele.pdf. 
Danish Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs. ‘Consolidated Act on Integration of 
Aliens in Denmark’. Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs, September 
2005. http://www.nyidanmark.dk/NR/rdonlyres/52136BD4-FA62-4818-AABB-
5709AABAC6A6/0/consolidation_act_no_422_7_june_2004.pdf. 
Davidson, Alastair. ‘Regional Politics: The European Union and Citizenship’. Citizenship Studies 1, no. 
1 (1997): 33–55. 
Davies, Peter. The Far Right in Europe : an Encyclopedia. Oxford: Westport  Conn.  ;Greenwood 
World Press, 2008. 
Development, OECD - Organisation for Economic Co-operation and, and Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development. OECD Territorial Reviews OECD Territorial Reviews: Oresund, 
Denmark/Sweden 2003. OECD Publishing, 2003. 
Dingu-Kyrklund, Elena. ‘Citizenship Rights for Aliens in Sweden’. In Citizenship in A Global World: 
Comparing Citizenship Rights for Aliens, edited by Atsushi Kondo, 47–70. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2001. 
Djuve, Anne Britt, and Hanne Cecilie Kavli. ‘Integrering i Danmark, Sverige Og Norge: Felles 
Utfordringer – Like Løsninger?’ Nordic Council of Ministers, 2007. 
Einhorn, Eric S., and John Logue. Modern Welfare States: Scandinavian Politics and Policy in the 
Global Age Second Edition. 2nd ed. Praeger Paperback, 2003. 
Ek, Richard. ‘“Subjects” in the Regional Camp?’ Uppsala, 2005. 
Entzinger, Han, and Renske Biezeveld. ‘Benchmarking in Immigrant Integration’. ERCOMER, August 
2003. 
Ersbøll, Eva. ‘Country Report: Denmark’. EUDO Citizenship Observatory: European University 
Institute, Florence, 2010. 
———. ‘Denmark: Abstract of the Country Report’. European Union Democracy Observatory on 
Citizenship, n.d. http://eudo-citizenship.eu/country-profiles/?country=Denmark. 
Espersen, Søren. ‘Danmark Må Ændre Sin Nordiske Politik’. DanskFolkeblad, October 2005. 
http://www.danskfolkeparti.dk/pictures_org/DanskFolkebladnr_5_2005.pdf. 
Eur-Lex. ‘Treaty Establishing the European Community - Part Two: Citizenship of the Union - Article 
17 - Artcile 8’. Text/html; charset=UTF-8. Official Journal C 325 , 24/12/2002 P. 0044 - 0044; 
Official Journal C 340 , 10/11/1997 P. 0186 - Consolidated Version; Official Journal C 224 , 
31/08/1992 P. 0010 - Consolidated Version;, n.d. http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:12002E017:EN:HTML. 
  
104 
 
Europa Press Releases RAPID. ‘EUROPA - Press Releases - Foreign Citizens Made up 6.5% of the EU27 
Population in 2010’, July 14, 2011. 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=STAT/11/105&type=HTML. 
European Institute for Comparative Urban Research. National Policy Responses to Urban Challenges 
in Europe. EURICUR Series. Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2007. 
European Parliament. ‘The Citizens of the Union and Their Rights’, July 2008. 
http://circa.europa.eu/irc/opoce/fact_sheets/info/data/citizen/citizens/article_7174_en.ht
m. 
Eurostat. ‘Migration and Migrant Population Statistics’. European Commission, 2011. 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Migration_and_migrant_p
opulation_statistics. 
Fairclough, Norman. Language and Power. Longman, 2001. 
Faist, Thomas, and Peter Kivisto. Dual Citizenship in Global Perspective: From Unitary to Multiple 
Citizenship. Palgrave MacMillan, 2007. 
Faist, Thomas. ‘Social Citizenship in the European Union: Nested Membership’. JCMS: Journal of 
Common Market Studies 39, no. 1 (2001): 37–58. 
Falkheimer, Jesper. Att Gestalta En Region: Källornas Stategier Och Mediernas Föreställningar Om 
Öresund. Centrum För Danmarksstudier 4. Makadam, 2004. 
Favell, Adrian, and Andrew Geddes. ‘European Integration, Immigration and the Nation State: 
Institutionalising Transnational Political Action?’ European Union Institute Working Papers 
RSC No. 99/32 (1999). 
Favell, Adrian. Philosophies of Integration: Immigration and the Idea of Citizenship in France and 
Britain. Palgrave Macmillan, 1998. 
Folketinget. ‘Nordisk Råd - Riv Grænsehindringerne Ned i Norden’, April 19, 2012. 
http://www.ft.dk/folketinget/udvalg_delegationer_kommissioner/delegationer_og_kommis
sioner/nordisk_raad/nyheder/2012/04/nor_graensehindringsdebat_2012.aspx. 
‘Freedom of Movement — Nordic Cooperation’, n.d. http://www.norden.org/en/news-and-
events/news/freedom-of-movement-1/. 
Freeman, Gary P. ‘National Models, Policy Types, and the Politics of Immigration in Liberal 
Democracies’. West European Politics 29, no. 2 (2006): 227–247. 
Geddes, Andrew. Immigration and European Integration: Beyond Fortress Europe? Manchester 
University Press, 2008. 
———. ‘The Europeanization of What? Migration, Asylum and the Politics of European Integration’. 
In The Europeanization of National Policies and Politics of Immigration: Between Autonomy 
and the European Union, edited by Thomas Faist and Andreas Ette. Palgrave Macmillan, 
2007. 
Gerdes, Jürgen, and Thomas Faist. ‘“Varying Views on Democracy, Rights and Duties, and 
Membership: The Politics of Dual Citizenship in European Immigration States”’. In Dual 
Citizenship in Global Perspective: From Unitary to Multiple Citizenship, edited by Thomas 
Faist and Peter Kivisto, 135–158. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. 
Global Talent Strategy. ‘Denmark Flunks as Talent Magnet’, December 8, 2011. 
http://globaltalentstrategy.com/en/article/denmark-flunks-as-talent-magnet-24. 
Goli, M, and Rezaei, S,. ‘Chapter 6: Denmark’. In European Immigration: a Sourcebook, edited by 
Triandafyllidou, A and Gropas, R. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007. 
Government Offices of Sweden. ‘New Rules for Labour Immigration’. Regeringskansliet, 2009. 
———. ‘The Swedish Citizenship Act’, 2008. http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/3926/a/29191. 
Grahl, John. ‘Regional Citizenship and Macroeconomic Constraints in the European Union’. 
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 20, no. 3 (1996): 480–497. 
Green-Pedersen, Christoffer, and Pontus Odmalm. ‘Going Different Ways? Right-wing Parties and 
the Immigrant Issue in Denmark and Sweden’. Journal of European Public Policy 15, no. 3 
(April 2008): 367–381. 
  
105 
 
Gregg Bucken-Knapp. ‘Just a Train-ride Away, but Still Worlds Apart: Prospects for the Oresund 
Region as a Binational City’. GeoJournal 54, no. 1 (2001): 51. 
———. ‘Shaping Possible Integration in the Emerging Cross-Border Oresund Region’. European 
Studies: A Journal of European Culture, History and Politics 19, no. 1 (2003): 55–79. 
Guild, Elspeth. ‘Moving the Borders of Europe’, University of Nijmegen, 2001. 
http://cmr.jur.ru.nl/cmr/docs/oratie.eg.pdf. 
Gustafson, Per. ‘Globalisation, Multiculturalism and Individualism: The Swedish Debate on Dual 
Citizenship’. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 28, no. 3 (July 2002). 
Haarder, Bertel. ‘Consolidated Act on Danish Nationality (2004)’. Ministry of Refugee, Immigration 
and Integration Affairs, June 7, 2004. http://www.nyidanmark.dk/NR/rdonlyres/52136BD4-
FA62-4818-AABB-5709AABAC6A6/0/consolidation_act_no_422_7_june_2004.pdf. 
Haas, Ernst B. ‘The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of 
Pretheorizing’. International Organization 24, no. 4 (October 1, 1970): 607–646. 
Hall, Patrik. ‘Opportunities for Democracy in Cross-border Regions? Lessons from the Øresund 
Region’. Regional Studies 42, no. 3 (April 2008): 423–435. 
Hammar, Tomas. European Immigration Policy: A Comparative Study. Cambridge University Press, 
2009. 
Hansen, Nana Wesley, Åsmund Arup Seip, and Line Eldring, eds. ‘Rekruttering av 
kompetansearbeidskraft fra tredjeland til Norden– Reguleringer, strategier og realiteter’. 
Nordic Council of Ministers, 2010. 
Hansen, Peo, and Sandy Brian Hager. The Politics of European Citizenship: Deepening Contradictions 
in Social Rights and Migration Policy. Berghahn Books, 2010. 
Hansen, Povl, and Goran Serin. ‘Rescaling or Institutional Flexibility? The Experience of the Cross-
border Øresund Region’. Regional & Federal Studies 20, no. 2 (May 2010): 201–227. 
Hansen, Randall, and Patrick Weil, eds. Towards A European Nationality: Citizenship, Immigration 
and Nationality Law in the EU. Palgrave Macmillan, 2001. 
Hedetoft, Ulf. ‘“Conceptual and Political Approaches to Integration: A Scandinavian Perspective”’. In 
Managing Integration: The European Union’s Responsibilities Towards Immigrants, edited by 
R. Süssmuth. Washington: Migration Policy Institute, 2005. 
———. ‘Denmark: Integrating Immigrants into a Homogeneous Welfare State’. Migration 
Information Source, 2006. 
http://www.migrationinformation.org/feature/display.cfm?ID=485. 
———. ‘Multiculturalism in Denmark and Sweden’. Danish Institute for International Studies, 
December 2006. 
Hedetoft, Ulf, Bo Petersson, and Lina Sturfelt, eds. Bortom Stereotyperna? : Invandrare Och 
Integration i Danmark Och Sverige. Centrum För Danmarksstudier 12. Stockholm: Makadam 
Förlag, 2006. 
Hellström, Anders, and Peter Hervik. ‘Feeding “the Beast”: Nourishing Nativist Appeals in Sweden 
and Denmark’. CoMID Working Paper Serier No.1, Aalborg University, 2011. 
Hermann, Christoph. ‘Neoliberalism in the European Union’. Studies in Political Economy 79 (2007). 
http://univie.academia.edu/ChristophHermann/Papers/839015/Neoliberalism_in_the_Euro
pean_Union. 
Hospers, Gert-Jan. ‘Borders, Bridges and Branding: The Transformation of the Øresund Region into 
an Imagined Space’. European Planning Studies 14, no. 8 (2006): 1015–1033. 
Howard, Marc Morjé. ‘Comparative Citizenship: An Agenda for Cross-National Research’. 
Perspectives on Politics 4, no. 03 (2006): 443–455. 
———. ‘Variation in Dual Citizenship Policies in the Countries of the EU’. International Migration 
Review 39, no. 3 (September 1, 2005): 697–720. 
Hurrell, Andrew. ‘Explaining the Resurgence of Regionalism in World Politics’. Review of 
International Studies 21, no. 4 (October 1, 1995): 331–358. 
Huset Mandag Morgen. ‘What Lies Ahead for the Nordic Model?’ Nordic Council of Ministers, 2007. 
  
106 
 
Ingebritsen, Christine. Scandinavia in World Politics. Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 
2006. 
International Organisation for Migration. ‘World Migration Report 2011: Communicating Effectively 
About Migration’. IOM, 2011. 
Jacobson, David. Rights Across Borders: Immigration and the Decline of Citizenship. BRILL, 1996. 
Jan Buursink. ‘The Binational Reality of Border-crossing Cities’. GeoJournal 54, no. 1 (2001): 7. 
Jens Rydgren. ‘Radical Right-wing Populism in Denmark and Sweden: Explaining Party System 
Change and Stability’. SAIS Review 30, no. 1 (2010): 57–71. 
Jerneck, Magnus, ed. Integration Och Utveckling i Öresundsregionen: Möjligheter Och Utmaningar. 
Lund: Lund University, 1999. 
Joppke, Christian. Challenge to the nation-state : immigration in Western Europe and the United 
States. Oxford [u.a.]: Oxford Univ. Press, 2007. 
———. ‘Citizenship Between De- and Re-Ethnicization’. European Journal of Sociology / Archives 
Européennes De Sociologie 44, no. 03 (2003): 429–458. 
———. ‘Transformation of Citizenship: Status, Rights, Identity’. Citizenship Studies 11, no. 1 (2007): 
37–48. 
Jørgensen, Martin Bak. ‘Dansk Realisme Og Svensk Naivitet? En Analyse Af Den Danske Og Svenske 
Integrationsspolitik’. In Bortom Stereotyperna? : Invandrare Och Integration i Danmark Och 
Sverige, edited by Ulf Hedetoft, Bo Petersson, and Lina Sturfelt. Centrum För 
Danmarksstudier 12. Stockholm: Makadam Förlag, n.d. 
———. ‘National and Transnational Identities: Turkish Organising Processes and Identity 
Construction in Denmark, Sweden and Germany’. Phd, Aalborg University, 2008. 
Keating, Michael, and John Loughlin. The Political Economy of Regionalism. Frank Cass, 1997. 
Ketels, Christian. Global Pressure- Nordic Solutions? The Nordic Globalization Barometer 2010. 
Nordic Council of Ministers, 2010. 
Kinhult, Pia. ‘Interview, Stockholm’, September 12, 2011. 
Kivisto, Peter, and Thomas Faist. Citizenship: Discourse, Theory, and Transnational Prospects. John 
Wiley & Sons, 2007. 
Kjærsgaard, Pia. ‘Sæt En Broklap i Øresundsbroen - Dansk Folkeparti’. Danskfolkeparti, 2005. 
http://danskfolkeparti.dk/Pia_Kj%C3%A6rsgaard_S%C3%A6t_en_broklap_i_%C3%98resunds
broen.asp. 
Klitgaard Holm, Lærke. ‘Migration, National Tilhørsforhold Og Statsborgerskab’. In Bortom 
Stereotyperna? : Invandrare Och Integration i Danmark Och Sverige, edited by Ulf Hedetoft, 
Bo Petersson, and Lina Sturfelt. Centrum För Danmarksstudier 12. Stockholm: Makadam 
Förlag, 2006. 
Koopmans, Ruud. Contested Citizenship: Immigration And Cultural Diversity in Europe. University of 
Minnesota Press, 2005. 
Kostakopoulou, Dora. ‘Is There an Alternative to “Schengenland”?’ Political Studies 46, no. 5 
(December 1, 1998): 886–902. 
Kragh-Schwarz, Emil. ‘S må fastholde stram udlændingepolitik (Social Democrats must maintain strict 
immigration policy)’. Berlingske, June 13, 2012. 
http://m.b.dk/touch/article.pml;jsessionid=554EAB9A550BF2277006E8860E67738C.uw-
portal3?guid=20565506. 
Kymlicka, Will. ‘Immigration, Citizenship, Multiculturalism: Exploring the Links’. The Political 
Quarterly 74, no. s1, (August 1, 2003): 195–208. 
Lamont, Michèle, and Virág Molnár. ‘The Study of Boundaries in the Social Sciences’. Annual Review 
of Sociology 28, no. 1 (August 2002): 167–195. 
Larsen, Thomas. ‘Heading Towards a Change of Government in Denmark’. EU Observer, September 
14, 2011. http://euobserver.com/843/113620. 
Lawler, Peter. ‘Loyalty to the Folkhem? Scandinavian Scepticism and the European Project’. In 
Political Loyalty and the Nation-state, edited by Michael Waller. London: Routledge, 2003. 
  
107 
 
Layton-Henry, Zig. ‘Migrants, Refugees and Citizenship’. In Governing European Diversity, edited by 
Montserriat Guibernau. Sage Publications Ltd, 2001. 
Legrain, Philippe. ‘Denmark Needs All Kinds of Immigrants’. Philippe Legrain, October 1, 2007. 
http://www.philippelegrain.com/denmark-needs-all-kinds-of-immigrants/. 
Linde-Laursen, Anders. Bordering: Identity Processes Between the National and Personal. Ashgate 
Publishing, Ltd., 2010. 
Lofgren, O. ‘Regionauts: The Transformation of Cross-Border Regions in Scandinavia’. European 
Urban and Regional Studies 15, no. 3 (July 2008): 195–209. 
Löfgren, Orvar. ‘Border Zones and Mobility- The Case of the Öresund Region’. Copenhagen, 2009. 
———. ‘Regionauts: The Transformation of Cross-Border Regions in Scandinavia’. European Urban 
and Regional Studies 15, no. 3 (July 1, 2008): 195–209. 
Lundsgaard, Vinnie, and Ea Elsbøl. ‘Lov Og Policy På Integrationsområdet I Danmark Og Sverige – En 
Komparativ Analyse’. Kadidatuddannelsen, Aalborg University, 2011. 
Maas, Willem. ‘Freedom of Movement Inside “Fortress Europe”’. In Global Surveillance and Policing, 
edited by Elia Zureik and Mark Salter, 233–245. Devon: Willan, 2005. 
‘Malmö Mayor: Danish “xenophobia” Bad News for Region’, n.d. 
http://www.cphpost.dk/news/local/87-local/51034-malmoe-mayor-danish-xenophobia-bad-
news-for-region.html. 
Mansfield, Edward D., and Etel Solingen. ‘Regionalism’. Annual Review of Political Science 13, no. 1 
(May 2010): 145–163. 
Margheritis, Ana, and William Hummel. ‘Linking Regional Integration and Migration Policies in 
Europe and South America: Facts and Concepts in Comparative Perspective’. Portugal, 2010. 
Marshall, Thomas Humphrey, and Tom Bottomore. Citizenship and Social Class. Pluto Press, 1992. 
Mikaelsen, Henrik. ‘Tiden Løbet Fra Integration’. DR Politik, March 9, 2011. 
http://www.dr.dk/Nyheder/Politik/2011/03/09/021347.htm. 
Ministry of Industry, Employment and Communications. ‘Integration Policy for the 21st Century 
(2001/02:129)’. Regeringskansliet, June 2002. 
Ministry of Justice. ‘New to Denmark - Dual Nationality’, 2012. http://www.nyidanmark.dk/en-
us/coming_to_dk/danish_nationality/dual_nationality.htm. 
Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integratin affairs. ‘A New Chance for Everyone- the Danish 
Government’s Integration Plan’. Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integratin affairs, May 
2005. 
MIPEX. ‘Access to Nationality’. Migrant Integration Policy Index, 2012. http://www.mipex.eu/access-
to-nationality. 
———. ‘Denmark’, n.d. http://www.mipex.eu/denmark. 
———. ‘Migrant Integration Policy Index | MIPEX’, n.d. http://www.mipex.eu/. 
———. ‘MIPEX Methodology’, n.d. http://www.mipex.eu/methodology. 
Mostov, Julie. ‘Soft Borders and Transnational Citizens’. In Identities, Affiliations and Allegiances, 
edited by Şeyla Benhabib, Ian Shapiro, and Danilo Petranović. Cambridge University Press, 
2007. 
New to Denmark. ‘A comprehensive integration initiative – and better integration’. New to 
Denmark.dk: The official portal for foreigners and integration, June 8, 2006. 
http://www.nyidanmark.dk/en-
us/Integration/a_comprehensive_integration_initiative/a_comprehensive_integration_initia
tive.htm. 
Nordic Council. ‘1953-1971 — Nordic Cooperation’, n.d. http://www.norden.org/en/nordic-
council/the-nordic-council/the-history-of-the-nordic-council/1953-1971. 
Nordic Council of Ministers. ‘The Nordic Countries -  One Workplace, One Market: A Report on 
Removal of Cross-border Obstacles by Special Envoy Poul Schluter 2005’. Nordic Council of 
Ministers, 2005. 
  
108 
 
Nordic Council. Question Time: Ministers of Cooperation. Nordic Council Session. Oslo, 2003. 
http://docs.norden.org/Blaboken/2003/main_content.htm. 
———. ‘Regional Policy — Nordic Cooperation’, n.d. http://www.norden.org/en/about-nordic-co-
operation/areas-of-co-operation/regional-policy. 
———. ‘Swedish MP Marvels at Danish Law’, November 12, 2007. http://www.norden.org/en/news-
and-events/news/swedish-mp-marvels-at-danish-law. 
———. ‘Theme Debate on Freedom of Movement in the Nordic Parliaments’, April 11, 2012. 
http://www.norden.org/en/nordic-council/organisation-and-structure/national-
delegations/events/theme-debate-on-freedom-of-movement-in-the-nordic-parliaments. 
‘Ny i Danmark - All Immigrants Do Not Have the Same Prerequisites for Integration’, n.d. 
http://www.nyidanmark.dk/da-
dk/ministeren/artikler_debatindlaeg_og_taler/2011/all_immigrants_do_not_have_the_sam
e_prerequisites_for_integration.htm. 
Öresund Committee. ‘33 Hindringer, Udfordringer Og Muligheder: Oresundsmodellen 2010’, n.d. 
———. ‘Annual Review: 2010’. Öresundskomiteen, 2011. 
———. ‘Knowledge and Innovation | Öresundskomiteen’, n.d. 
http://www.oresundskomiteen.org/en/knowledge-and-innovation/. 
———. ‘Labour Market and Cross-border Obstacles’, n.d. http://www.oresundskomiteen.dk/Focus-
areas/Labour-market-and-cross-border-obstacles. 
———. ‘Öresund and the Nordic Countries’, n.d. http://www.oresundskomiteen.dk/Working-
together/-resund-and-the-Nordic-countries/-resund-and-the-Nordic-countries. 
———. ‘Öresund Region Application for “AEBR-Cross Border Award” 2011’. AEBR website, 2011. 
http://www.aebr.eu/en/pdf/winner_1_2011_en.pdf. 
———. ‘Öresundsregionen: The Human Capital of Scandinavia’. Öresundskomiteen, 2005. 
———. ‘Organisation’, n.d. http://www.oresundskomiteen.dk/About--
resundskomiteen/Organization. 
———. ‘ØRUS: Öresund Regional Strategy’. Öresundskomiteen, 2010. 
http://www.oresundskomiteen.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/ORUS_EN.pdf. 
———. ‘The Creation of a Crossborder Region’, n.d. 
http://www.oresund.com/oresund/creation/committee.htm#Goal. 
Øresund. ‘Øresundsregionen’, n.d. http://www.oresundsregionen.org/About.aspx. 
‘Øresund University Network’, n.d. http://www.uni.oresund.org/. 
Oresund.org. ‘Home-Øresund’, n.d. http://www.oresund.org/. 
‘OresundDirekt’, n.d. http://www.oresunddirekt.com/. 
Øresundsbro Consortium Analysis Department. ‘10 Years: The Øresund Bridge and Its Region’. 
Øresundsbro Consortium, June 2010. 
Paasi, Anssi. ‘Generations and the “Development” of Border Studies’. Geopolitics 10, no. 4 (January 
1, 2005): 663–671. 
———. ‘The Resurgence of the Region and Regional Identity: Theoretical Perspectives and Empirical 
Observations on Regional Dynamics in Europe’. Review of International Studies 35 (2009): 
121– 146. 
———. ‘The Resurgence of the “Region” and “Regional Identity”: Theoretical Perspectives and 
Empirical Observations on Regional Dynamics in Europe’. Review of International Studies 35, 
no. Supplement S1 (2009): 121–146. 
Parkes, Roderick. ‘Immigrant Integration Meets European Integration’, Working Paper FG 1, SWP 
Berlin, March 2008.  
Persson, Daniel. ‘Interview, Öresund Secretariat Public Affairs Spokesperson, Stockholm’, September 
12, 2011. 
Recchi, Ettore, and Adrian Favell. Pioneers of European Integration: Citizenship and Mobility in the 
Eu. Edward Elgar Publishing, 2009. 
Reepalu, Ilmar. ‘Interview, Stockholm’, September 12, 2011. 
  
109 
 
Regeringskansliet. ‘Svenskt Medborgarskap (SOU 1999:34)’, 1999. 
http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/108/a/2401. 
Rostek, Karolina, and Gareth Davies. ‘The Impact of Union Citizenship on National Citizenship 
Policies’. European Integration Online Papers 10 (2006). 
Roxburgh, Angus. Preachers of Hate: The Rise of the Far Right. Gibson Square, 2002. 
Rubin, Fredrik. ‘Åbent Brev Til Danmark Fra Sverige - Politiken.dk’, February 18, 2011. 
http://politiken.dk/debat/ECE1200053/aabent-brev-til-danmark-fra-sverige/. 
Rubin, Lindsey. ‘Love’s Refugees: The Effects of Stringent Danish Immigration Policies on Danes and 
Their Non-Danish Spouses’. Connecticut Journal of International Law 20 (2005 2004): 319. 
Ruedin, Didier. ‘The Reliability of MIPEX Indicators as Scales’, Swiss Forum for Migration and Population 
Studies, SOM Working Paper No. 2011-03, 2011  
Sassen, Saskia. Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages. Princeton 
University Press, 2006. 
Schain, Martin A. ‘The State Strikes Back: Immigration Policy in the European Union’. European 
Journal of International Law 20, no. 1 (February 1, 2009): 93–109. 
Smith, Anthony D. ‘National Identity and the Idea of European Unity’. International Affairs (Royal 
Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 68, no. 1 (January 1, 1992): 55–76. 
Soysal, Yasemin Nuhoğlu. Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe. 
University of Chicago Press, 1994. 
Spencer, Sarah. ‘The Challenges of Integration for the EU’. The Migration Information Source, 2003. 
http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?ID=170. 
Stamming, Mikael. ‘Interview, Stockholm’, September 12, 2011. 
Stavad, Ole. ‘Interview, Stockholm’, September 12, 2011. 
Süssmuth, Rita, Werner Weidenfeld, Bertelsmann Stiftung (Gütersloh Germany), and Migration 
Policy Institute. Managing Integration: The European Union’s Responsibilities Towards 
Immigrants. Migration Policy Institute, 2005. 
Süssmuth, Rita, and Werner Weidenfeld, eds. Managing Integration: The European Union’s 
Responsibilities Towards Immigrants. Migration Policy Institute and The Bertelsmann 
Foundation, 2005. 
Tendens Øresund. ‘Commuting Across Öresund’, n.d. http://www.tendensoresund.org/en/en/new-
trends/commuting. 
———. ‘Migration Flows’, n.d. http://www.tendensoresund.org/en/migration-across-oresund. 
‘The Nordic Governments Must Work Together on Immigration — Nordic Cooperation’, n.d. 
http://www.norden.org/en/news-and-events/news/the-nordic-governments-must-work-
together-on-immigration?searchterm=immigration. 
Torben Dall Schmidt. ‘Cross-border Regional Enlargement in Øresund’. GeoJournal 64, no. 3 (2005): 
249. 
Torpey, John. ‘Coming and Going: On the State Monopolization of the Legitimate “Means of 
Movement”’. Sociological Theory 16, no. 3 (November 1, 1998): 239–259. 
Trachtman, Joel. ‘The Political Economy of International Labor Migration Law’. Employment Research 
17, no. 2 (2010). http://research.upjohn.org/empl_research/vol17/iss2/2. 
Transatlantic Council on Migration. ‘Transatlantic Council Statement: Delivering Citizenship’, April 
2008. http://www.migrationpolicy.org/transatlantic/Citizenship_TCMStatement.pdf. 
Ullenhag, Erik. ‘Interview with Minister of Integration’, September 13, 2011. 
———. ‘Multiculture and Multiculturalism - a European Debate’ presented at the Lund Association 
of Foreign Affairs, Lund University, September 13, 2011. 
UNESCO. ‘United Nations Convention on Migrants’ Rights - Information Kit’. UNESCO, 2005. 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001435/143557e.pdf. 
Vacher, Mark, Tom O’Dell, and Laura Schollert Hvalsum, eds. ‘Temporal and Spacial Modalities of 
Everday Integration’. Lund and Copenhagen Universities, 2011. 
  
110 
 
Villemoes, Søren. ‘Kære Bror Sverige, Fej for Din Egen Dør Først’. Politiken, March 1, 2011. 
http://politiken.dk/debat/ECE1209412/kaere-bror-sverige-fej-for-din-egen-doer-foerst/. 
Wendt, Alexander. ‘Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics’. 
International Organization 46, no. 2 (1992). 
Wooldridge, Ian, and George Orwell. Animal Farm. Nick Hern Books, 2004. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
